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Abstract
Part I of this article briefly describes customary law and explores the effect of colonialism on
legal pluralism and the region’s early post-colonial constitutions. Part II describes the structure
and content of constitutional clauses that exclude personal law and customary law from constitu-
tional non-discrimination protection. Part III briefly examines international and regional human
rights law and offers a pragmatic conclusion that countries must eliminate exclusionary clauses
in order to conform to human rights commitments. Part IV provides a theoretical justification
for eliminating exclusionary clauses from these constitutions. This section builds upon feminist
theory and dialogic constitutionalism to argue that countries should eliminate constitutional ex-
clusionary clauses in order to dismantle the faulty public/private dichotomy and provide a voice
for women in constitutional debates over the normative content of customary law. Finally, Part V
assesses alternatives for judicial intervention once the exclusionary clauses have been eliminated
through constitutional amendment. This part explores a number of strategies courts might employ
in interpreting personal and customary law in light of constitutional equality guarantees, ranging
from less interventionist to more interventionist. These intervention strategies include limited in-
tervention, in which customary law is largely left to evolve on its own; formalist intervention, in
which gender equality rights clearly trump rights to custom or vice versa; and activist intervention,
in which courts must balance gender equality rights with rights to custom. This article proposes
a rights-balancing approach that values both culture and equality rights. Recent jurisprudence in
South Africa illustrates the promise of a type of rights balancing that I call “weighted balancing.”
Eliminating exclusionary clauses and encouraging courts to balance relevant rights is the only
way to facilitate a constitutional dialogue that will ultimately determine the normative content of
constitutional equality guarantees as applied to personal and customary law.
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INTRODUCTION
Multiculturalism has long been considered inimical to gen-
der equality.' In the last two decades, many proponents of mul-
ticulturalism and feminism have perpetuated a dichotomous ap-
proach to identity in which an equality-minded, rights-seeking
woman could not meaningfully enjoy membership in a cultural
community.2 This misguided, unitary understanding of the self
would require such a woman to exit from her familial or cultural
community, often at great personal cost, to fulfill her individual
right to equality.'
In recent years, however, feminists and multiculturalists
alike have begun to explore what it means for women to rede-
fine cultural norms in ways that are consistent with equality prin-
ciples.4 Around the world, women are exploring new ways to
interpret old texts and challenging traditional or customary in-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. For their
thoughtful comments and suggestions, I thank the participants in the 2006-2007 Poto-
mac Valley Writers Workshop, specifically Elizabeth Bruch, Matt Fraiden, Vivian Hamil-
ton, MargaretJohnson, Kate Kruse, and Victoria Phillips. I am also grateful to the Uni-
versity of Wyoming George Hopper Faculty Research Fund for supporting this work.
1. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of
Cultural Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12
J.L. & RELIGION 143, 152 (1996) (discussing a recent human rights document that cre-
ates a clear conflict between "human rights norms and the religious and cultural prac-
tices of the majority of humankind."); see also Tracey E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Rela-
tivism, and Human Rights, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 125-26 (1996) (arguing that in-
sights from anti-essentialist theory help to negotiate a middle path between
universalism and relativism or multiculturalism and feminism).
2. See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, in Is MULTICULTURAL-
ISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7, 10 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
3. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERsITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA 101 (2002) ("There is little doubt that women's concerns and the status of
the private sphere expose the vulnerability of multicultural arrangements and reveal
the unjust moral and political compromises, achieved at the expense of women and
children, upon which they often rest.").
4. See id. at 104 (stating that various plights of women and children can be
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stitutions to conform to gender equality norms.5 As such, they
have rejected the notion that they must choose between their
identity as gender equality-seeking individuals and members of
cultural communities. Understandably, they want both.
To challenge and redefine cultural norms from within a cul-
tural community, women must have opportunities to engage
with the authoritative sources of cultural meaning.6 In some so-
cieties, this engagement will take the form of feminist academics
who dedicate themselves to reinterpreting traditional religious
dictates.7 In others, the effort may entail extensive grassroots
consciousness-raising concerning women's status within the
community.8 Ideally, women will use multiple points of access to
engage with and interpret cultural meaning.
In parts of Commonwealth Africa, however, feminists face
severe structural impediments to any systematic engagement
with traditional custom and culture. These structural impedi-
ments have an unlikely source. They are firmly embedded in
constitutional text. The constitutions of a handful of countries
in the African Commonwealth contain provisions that specifi-
cally exclude family and customary law from constitutional non-
discrimination protection. In other words, a woman may invoke
constitutional equality guarantees but only if the contested issue
does not concern "marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of prop-
erty on death or other like matters which is the personal law of
persons of that description."9 The exclusion of family law from
the constitution can have a devastating effect on women in those
"avoided, in theory as well as in practice, by modifying our understandings of culture;
rejecting cultural holism .... ").
5. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Constitutional Transformation, Gender
Equality, and Religious/National Conflict in Israel: Tentative Progress Through the Obstacle
Course, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE 205 (Beverley Baines & Ruth
Rubio-Marin eds., 2005) (examining the progress of Israeli women in advancing the
gender equality agenda through constitutional jurisprudence and legislative initiatives).
6. See BENHABIB, supra note 3, at 104 (suggesting that we have "more faith in the
capacity of ordinary political actors to renegotiate their own narratives of identity and
difference through multicultural encounters in a democratic civil society.").
7. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1450 (2003) (discussing
the organization Women Living Under Muslim Laws and its practice of encouraging
women to question and re-interpret the traditional teachings of the Qur'an).
8. See id. at 1451 (discussing activities that require women to organize or lead
groups to pursue a common goal as a way to redefine cultural norms).
9. LESOTHO CONST. s. 18(4)(b) (1993).
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countries.' Because those issues that most commonly affect wo-
men are external to the constitution, women lack a crucial vehi-
cle through which to negotiate the meaning of cultural norms in
light of equality guarantees.
The discussion of constitutionalism in Commonwealth Af-
rica is fraught with the complex interplay of nationalism, preser-
vation of custom, and contemporary conceptions of equality.11
The history of colonialism in the region has created a plural le-
gal system in which multiple systems of law-statutory, custom-
ary, and religious-operate simultaneously. 2 Although the co-
lonial authorities created the system in an effort to preserve in-
digenous custom and appease traditional leaders, it has left
women subject to varying, and often insufficient, equality
rights. 3
The drafters of the early post-colonial constitutions strug-
gled with the balance between protecting communal or minority
group rights and individual rights. Many of the post-colonial
constitutions contained non-discrimination provisions that spe-
cifically excluded personal law, including most family law issues,
from constitutional protection. 4 Although many of the inde-
pendence constitutions in Commonwealth Africa articulated a
commitment to gender equality, the exclusion of personal and
customary law from constitutional protection has severely under-
mined that commitment.'"
10. See David M. Bigge & Amelie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts:
Women's Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 289, 294 (2000) (discussing the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe's decision in Magaya v.
Magaya, SC No. 210-98 (Zimbabwe, Feb. 16, 1999), which demonstrated that women
are still denied the full benefit of domestic inheritance laws).
11. See Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, Introduction: Toward a Feminist Consti-
tutional Agenda, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 1,
12 (noting that feminists in South Africa, among other countries, "have not hesitated to
identify some disadvantages women experience under these religious and customary
jurisdictions, and to argue for the necessity of greater harmonization with women's
constitutional rights.").
12. See Johanna Bond, Chapter Introduction: Women's Rights within the Family, in
VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN: WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN GHANA, UGANDA, AND TANZANIA 181,
182 (Johanna Bond ed., 2005).
13. See id. (noting, for example, "[t]he rights that a woman may legally enjoy dur-
ing her marriage and at its dissolution depend upon the type of marriage into which
she has entered.").
14. See, e.g., LEsoTo CONST. s. 18(4) (1993).
15. See Kivutha Kibwana, Women, Politics and Gender Politiking: Questions from Kenya,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES 194,
2008]
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Many Commonwealth African countries have amended
their constitutions significantly in the approximately forty years
since independence.' 6 Some countries have eliminated the ex-
clusionary provisions that place personal and customary law
outside the purview of constitutional protection; others have
not.' 7 Since 1990, the continent has ushered in a number of
new or reformed constitutions,"8 all of which grapple with the
desire to preserve custom and cultural identity at the same time
that they recognize women's equality rights.' 9
Almost without exception, the new or reformed constitu-
tions among Commonwealth countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in-
clude protection against gender discrimination. 20  They vary
with respect to how vigorously and completely they protect wo-
men against discrimination.2' In most cases, however, the new
constitutions represent a significant advance for women's rights
on the continent.
Despite the marked trend toward increased constitutional
protection for women's rights, a number of countries in the re-
205 (1. Oloka-Onyango ed., 2001) (suggesting that these kinds of exclusionary clauses
amount to constitutional contradictions).
16. Some amendments have concerned individual rights, but many have involved
political representation and the prevention of authoritarian rule in response to military
coups and other unauthorized assertions of power throughout the region during the
post-colonial period. See Peter Slinn, A Fresh Start for Africa? New African Constitutional
Perspectives for the 1990s, 35J. AFRICAN L. 1, 1 (1991). "[I]n almost all the independent
countries of sub-Saharan Africa free political competition was eliminated either by the
establishment of the one-party state or the complete replacement of civilian politicians
by military rulers." Id. Barry Munslow offered the following explanation as to why Af-
rica has experienced so many authoritative rulers in the post-colonial period: "The
problem was not so much a failure by Africans to learn the lesson of parliamentary
government: rather, the lesson of authoritarian colonial rule was taught and learnt too
well." Id. at 6 (quoting Barry Munslow, Why Has the Westminster Model Failed in Africa?, 36
PARLIAMENTARY AFFuARS 218 (1983)).
17. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (listing African countries that have
exclusionary provisions and quoting the relevant article of several constitutions).
18. For example, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa lists the constitutions
for sixteen countries in Africa, ten of which were adopted in 1990 or later. See Electoral
Institute of Southern Africa, ESA Comparative Data: Constitution, http://www.eisa.org.
za/WEP/comconstitution.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). The Constitutions for every
one of these sixteen countries has been amended since 1990. See id.
19. Although it is misrepresentative to construe culture and equality as inherently
conflicting, judges must, at times, confront conflicts between these rights in constitu-
tional interpretation.
20. See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAw & POLICY, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: LAws AND
POLICIEs AFFECTING THEIR REPRODUCrvE LIVEs: ANGLOPHONE AFRICA 153 (2001).
21. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
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gion have retained clauses that exclude personal and customary
law-and, by extension, women-from constitutional non-dis-
crimination protection.2 2 This is not a constitutional anomaly
found in a lone post-colonial constitution, but rather a pattern
that is repeated throughout a number of Commonwealth Afri-
can constitutions. This Article examines this pattern of constitu-
tional exclusion, explores the theoretical rationale for its exis-
tence, and argues that constitutional reform is necessary to pro-
vide women with a voice in redefining personal and customary
law in a way that is consistent with equality principles. Because
women are excluded from litigating issues that most directly af-
fect their lives, exclusionary clauses deny women's constitutional
agency.23 Constitutional reform that opens the door for women
to litigate claims that are central to their lives marks the begin-
ning, not the end, of the struggle for women's equality. Without
public education and advocacy by the activist community, equal-
ity laws mean very little.24 Law reform that recognizes women's
constitutional agency, however, should be seen as a necessary
first step.
Part I of this Article briefly describes customary law and ex-
plores the effect of colonialism on legal pluralism and the re-
gion's early post-colonial constitutions. Part II describes the
structure and content of constitutional clauses that exclude per-
sonal law and customary law from constitutional non-discrimina-
tion protection. Part III briefly examines international and re-
gional human rights law and offers a pragmatic conclusion that
countries must eliminate exclusionary clauses in order to con-
form to human rights commitments. Part IV provides a theoreti-
cal justification for eliminating exclusionary clauses from these
constitutions. This section builds upon feminist theory and dia-
22. The following eight countries have retained exclusionary provisions: Bot-
swana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See
infra note 88 and accompanying text.
23. Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin aptly use the term "constitutional
agency" to describe the ways in which women use the constitution to bring about im-
provements in women's legal status. Baines & Rubio-Marin, supra note 11, at 7-8. They
conclude, "women who are active in feminist movements have begun to identify consti-
tutions and constitutional change as relevant to our lives." Id. at 7.
24. SeeJ. Oloka-Onyango, Constitutionalism in Africa: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES, supra
note 15, at 10 (noting "constitutional reform per se is clearly insufficient and must be
accompanied by consciousness raising and the transformation of culture.").
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logic constitutionalism to argue that countries should eliminate
constitutional exclusionary clauses in order to dismantle the
faulty public/private dichotomy and provide a voice for women
in constitutional debates over the normative content of custom-
ary law.
Finally, Part V assesses alternatives for judicial intervention
once the exclusionary clauses have been eliminated through
constitutional amendment. This part explores a number of strat-
egies courts might employ in interpreting personal and custom-
ary law in light of constitutional equality guarantees, ranging
from less interventionist to more interventionist. These inter-
vention strategies include limited intervention, in which custom-
ary law is largely left to evolve on its own; formalist intervention,
in which gender equality rights clearly trump rights to custom or
vice versa; and activist intervention, in which courts must balance
gender equality rights with rights to custom. This Article pro-
poses a rights-balancing approach that values both culture and
equality rights. Recent jurisprudence in South Africa illustrates
the promise of a type of rights balancing that I call "weighted
balancing." Eliminating exclusionary clauses and encouraging
courts to balance relevant rights is the only way to facilitate a
constitutional dialogue that will ultimately determine the norma-
tive content of constitutional equality guarantees as applied to
personal and customary law.
Two cautionary notes are appropriate here. The first in-
volves comparative analysis across the borders of very different
countries. Too often, African states are lumped together and
collectively addressed as "the continent," despite vast differences
in historical, social, cultural and legal backgrounds.25 This Arti-
cle attempts to overcome this analytical difficulty by providing
some context within which to locate and ground the discussion.
In a work of this length, however, it is impossible to provide
enough context to offer a complete picture of the countries dis-
cussed. Despite these shortcomings, there is considerable value
in comparative analysis, and this Article offers some cautious
25. See JOHN HATCHARD, MUNA NDULO & PETER SLINN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH: AN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN
AFRICAN PERSPECTIE 8 (2004) (suggesting that there is a risk of "over-generalising the
problems and the solutions applicable to individual countries.").
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generalizations in an effort to diagnose and explore regional
trends.
The second cautionary note involves the Article's treatment
of custom and customary law. Academics in the United States
have traditionally discussed custom primarily with reference to
foreign legal systems, leading to an understanding of custom as
it relates to other legal systems but not our own. Recent, com-
pelling scholarship has exposed the inherent bias in approach-
ing custom this way. Leti Volpp, for example, has demonstrated
that ignoring how custom operates in our own legal system leads
to a narrow, racist understanding of custom as inferior and
"other. '26 This Article ventures warily into a discussion of Afri-
can custom and customary law with an awareness of the hege-
monic pitfalls of such a discussion. 27 Comparative analysis of wo-
men's rights within the U.S. legal culture, however, is simply
outside the scope of this Article.28
It is worth noting that much of the literature on African cus-
tom treats customary law as uniformly regressive.29 Such a view
leads to a reductive image of African women defined solely as
victims of their culture." As a corollary, it neglects African wo-
men's agency as participants in, and in some cases, resisters of
their culture. According to this limited understanding, women
have nothing to gain through active engagement with custom
and tradition. In fact, custom is viewed as a harmful anachro-
nism, whereas statutory law is seen as progress, the hope of the
future.31 Although this Article ultimately recommends a statu-
tory remedy, it does so with the understanding that there is value
26. See Let Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1181, 1193-
94 (2001).
27. See, e.g., id. at 1184 (noting that the point is "not that we ought to eliminate or
dismiss feminist values, but to suggest they will broaden and shift when we examine
immigrant women and Third World women in a more accurate light.").
28. For a comparative discussion of U.S. laws and pluralistic legal systems, see gener-
ally Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women's Status: An Examination
of Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 AIASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 65
(2006).
29. See, e.g., Okin, supra note 2, at 13.
30. See Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native"
Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 1, 2
(2002) (describing how the emphasis on the Third World victim subject amounts to
gender and cultural essentialism).
31. See Sunder, supra note 7, at 1414 (describing a historicist view in which relig-
ious law constitutes "law's past").
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in the preservation of custom and culture. It is only when cus-
tom, as articulated by cultural elites, is permitted to harm vulner-
able group members, such as women, that it must be altered to
bring it into conformity with constitutional equality guaran-
tees.
3 2
I. BACKGROUND
A. African Customary Law
African customary law primarily regulates personal, familial
issues, or relationships between private persons.3 3 It consists of
largely unwritten rules or laws that may be applied informally by
traditional leaders or, in some cases, by the courts.3 4 Official cus-
tomary law, the law reflected in judicial precedents and aca-
demic texts, is often quite different from the more dynamic "liv-
ing" customary law that reflects the actual day-to-day practices of
communities." Customary law also varies between ethnic
groups and, at times, even between villages.3 6 Because it can be
difficult to ascertain what the law is, judges who are tasked with
interpreting customary law often turn to prior judicial articula-
tions of customary law or descriptions of the law in academic
texts.37 This leads to a misunderstanding of customary law as
ossified or fixed in time rather than as a flexible, evolving system
of law.38
The difficulty in interpreting customary law is compounded
by the region's colonial past. During the colonial period, colo-
nial administrators brought customary law into the colonial
court system, filtering the law through the lens of British under-
32. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
33. See Wieland Lehnert, The Role of the Courts in the Conflict Between African Custom-
ary Law and Human Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 247 (2005).
34. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union and
Women's Rights, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38-39 (2003).
35. See Lehnert, supra note 33, at 246.
36. See Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context of
Legal Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 385, 388 (2006).
37. For a useful typology of customary law, see Alice Armstrong et al., Uncovering
Reality: Excavating Women's Rights in African Family Law, 7 Irr'LJ.L. & FAM. 314, 324-25
(1993).
38. See id. at 327; Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the
Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 Hum. RTS. Q. 838, 841 (observ-
ing "[r]eferences to 'traditional African culture' or a 'traditional Asian culture' often
convey the idea of a monolithic and unchanging pre-modern state of affairs to be con-
trasted with modem Western traditions.").
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standing. 9 Sweeping economic changes and corresponding
changes in labor migration during the colonial period disrupted
African customs, establishing a new version of customary law
"which suited the white administrators and African male elders
who ruled colonial society."4 ° Colonial authorities, for example,
helped to establish a system of law that recognized only African
males as title-holders to land in part because that form of patriar-
chal hierarchy resonated with British conceptions of the fam-
ily.4" Although some have characterized the influence of colo-
nial authorities on the interpretation of customary law as a "cor-
ruption"4 2 of true, pure customary law, this understanding
suggests that law may exist in an objective, unadulterated state. I
do not mean to suggest that here. The interaction between colo-
nial authorities and indigenous leaders, however, transformed
39. As Alice Armstrong and her colleagues suggest:
The very process of "feeding" customary law into the colonial court system led
to a construction of a customary law that often sharply contrasted with African
systems of justice which focus more on the processes of achieving peaceful
resolutions of disputes rather than on adherence to rules as the basis of deter-
mining disputes ...the preoccupation by western courts with ascertaining
rules of substantive law where, in fact, none existed resulted in the construc-
tion of rules which were often neither customary nor equitable to women.
Armstrong et al., supra note 37, at 325.
40. Martin Chanock, Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of
Family Law Reform, 3 INT'LJ.L. & FAM. 72, 72 (1989). Chanock explains:
[Male elders'] assertion of control over women, and over family property, was
supported by colonial administrations as it accorded with the administrators'
own prescriptions for African societies. As one traces the story of these devel-
opments it becomes plain that customary law is to be treated as a matter of
politics and not of culture. If, then, one were to resist its continuing operation
in the post-colonial state one could do so on the basis of resistance to the
political premises and demands, and not on the basis of the denial of viability
or dignity to an indigenous culture.
Id. at 76.
41. "[T]he British introduced formal land registration in the names of individual,
not lineage, title-holders and, because of their own cultural biases, registered land only
in men's names." RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 190
(1986); see also id. at 10 (noting that during the colonial period "traditional relations
between the sexes were distorted by the imposition of Western patriarchal ideals.");
Chanock, supra note 40, at 77 ("The family law of England during the colonial period
was not devoted to equality between men and women .... The early impetus to reform
African marriage laws in the name of female emancipation was replaced by support
from the colonial state for the preservation, and in some cases the extension, of male
power.").
42. I borrow Alice Armstrong and her colleagues' characterization of customary
law as a "corrupted version" of traditional ways. See Armstrong et al., supra note 37, at
325.
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custom and customary law by interpreting it through a colonial
lens.
In addition to the external influence of colonial authorities,
some permutations in customary law grew out of an internal mis-
characterization of custom in the form of court testimony of-
fered by the indigenous African population. For example, when
judges attempted to apply customary law in a particular case, wit-
nesses often testified as to the substantive content and require-
ments of customary law in a certain community.43 When these
witnesses, who were usually male elders, testified about a particu-
lar custom in question, they often offered an interpretation of
the custom that was favorable to their position." As Fareda
Banda observes, "[f] or the indigenous men involved in this pro-
cess of interpretation of the customary law, it was a question of
an oppressed group using their limited leverage to gain for
themselves more rights and privileges."' 5
43. See id. ("[W]hat the elders and other witnesses gave as evidence of customary
law was a distorted and rigid version of customary law designed to express their idea of
what the law should be and not what it really was ... their versions were greatly influ-
enced by the elders' anger and frustration at their loss of political power and challenges
they were facing at the time from women and young men.").
44. See Fareda Banda, Global Standards: Local Values, 17 Ir'LJ.L. POL'v & FAM. 1, 7-
8 (2003). Banda notes:
Discussing South Africa Walker has noted that both the indigenous men and
the colonizers were committed to tradition and traditional leadership so that
"successive white governments worked to refashion pre-colonial society in the
interests not only of a white but also of a patriarchal supremacy." This muta-
tion of local claims into legal rules took place, as Chanock notes... "through
a process not only of selective understanding by colonial officials but also of
selective presentation of claims."
Id. at 7-8.
45. Id. at 8. Similarly, Welshman Ncube asserts:
[M]ost of what is today held out as "our" customary law is a "construction" of
the colonial judiciary in complicity with some elders of the African society,
who redesigned most of what is today presented as customary law so as to
increase male authority and control over women and children, to compensate
for the loss of their political and social power to the colonial state.
Uche U. Ewelukwa, Post-Colonialism, Gender, Customay Injustice: Widows in African Socie-
ties, 24 HuM. RTs. Q. 424, 432 (2002) (citing Welshman Ncube, The White Paper on Mar-
riage and Inheritance in Zimbabwe: An Exercise in Superfluity and Mischief, 5 LEGAL F. 10, 12
(1993)). Martin Chanock notes:
We are able to trace in the colonial period how, for example, male elders were
able to press for and establish as customary law a form of marriage which was
clearly not that practiced by most people in pre-colonial or early colonial
times and which was, indeed, resisted by many.
Chanock, supra note 40, at 76.
2008] CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION AND GENDER 299
Indigenous male leaders thus had an interest in establishing
a source of authority, particularly in light of colonial oppression.
The colonizers, in turn, had an interest in pleasing indigenous
male leaders whose labor and cooperation was needed for effec-
tive colonial administration and economic development.46 In
part to appease indigenous leaders, the colonial authorities allo-
cated control over personal law to indigenous communities.
Personal law, however, was never truly free of British influence.4 7
It was this interaction between traditional elites and colonial au-
thorities that led to the distortion of custom and customary law
during the colonial period.
B. The Colonial Era & the Creation of Legal Pluralism
The history of constitutionalism in Africa begins with the
colonial period. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, the colonial
powers partitioned the continent into territorial units.48 These
arbitrary divisions have led at least one commentator to con-
clude that the continent will not stabilize politically until there is
a radical geographic reorganization of the borders on the conti-
nent.4 9 Although such reorganization is not realistic, it is crucial
to understand the effect of the early colonial history on the con-
temporary African state. The arbitrary divisions imposed by the
46. See Banda, supra note 44, at 8 (noting that colonial authorities attempted to
keep the indigenous male population "reasonably happy for their co-operation was
needed in the form of labour to develop the country, and thus their assistance was
sought in developing the personal law to apply to the governed peoples.").
47. British colonial authorities, in fact, considered themselves missionaries of wo-
men's emancipation. Despite severe inequalities between women and men in British
society at the time, the colonial authorities attempted to eliminate some customary
practices that they considered "repugnant" to notions of morality and justice. See id.
48. See HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 13. John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo, and
Peter Slinn provide a fascinating historical example:
[I]n 1890, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister remarked at a dinner
that followed the conclusion of the Anglo-French Convention which estab-
lished spheres of influence in West Africa: "We have been engaged in drawing
lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have been giving
away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small
impediment that we never really knew exactly where the mountains and rivers
and lakes were."
Id. at 13 n.3 (quoting M. Makuwaw Wa Mukua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa? A Moral
and Legal Inquiry, 16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1135 (1995)).
49. See M. Makuwaw Wa Mukua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa? A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1118 (1995) (noting political difficulties created by
arbitrarily drawn national borders).
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colonialists and the changing economic environment disrupted
life and forced a departure from subsistence farming among Af-
rican communities.5 ° Colonial policies and practices resulted in
a great economic divide between urban and rural areas, a divide
that continues to this day.
51
The period of colonial rule was characterized by elitism and
authoritarian governance.5 2 "As colonial rulers sought expedi-
ent collaborators, they distorted or destroyed pre-colonial gov-
ernance systems by creating or encouraging arrangements such
as indirect rule, which made local chiefs more despotic and cre-
ated new ones (warrant chiefs) where none had previously ex-
isted."53 The British policy of indirect rule in Commonwealth
African colonies provided the indigenous population with some
measure of control over the private sphere, particularly with re-
spect to family or personal laws.54
Colonialism created a plural legal system, in which statutory,
customary and religious law operated simultaneously.55 In some
substantive areas, colonial authorities imported British law to
govern all people in the colonies. In other areas, such as family
law, colonial authorities recognized multiple sources of law.
Multiple systems of family or personal law still operate in many
Commonwealth African countries. In Ghana, for example, a
couple may choose to marry according to statutory law pursuant
to the Marriage Ordinance, according to customary law, or ac-
cording to Islamic law pursuant to the Marriage of Moham-
medans Ordinance. 56 An African could opt out of customary
marriage law by, for example, contracting a civil law marriage
under statutory law. In this case, statutory law rather than cus-
tomary law would govern the rights and duties of marriage. To
50. See HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 13 ("Dislocation of African peoples from
their lands and communities continued throughout the colonial period as the needs of
the colonial economy expanded, further undermining any tribal economy or social or-
ganization that were left in place after the initial establishment of colonial rule.").
51. See id. at 14 ("The result was a colonial state characterized by a huge gap in the
standard and quality of life between the rural and urban areas.").
52. See id. ("Colonial rule was philosophically and organisationally elitist, centralist
and absolute and left no room for either constitutions or representative institutions.").
53. Id.
54. See Armstrong et al., supra note 37, at 324 ("CC]ustom and tradition became a
means by which the local rulers and family heads bargained with the colonial state for
retaining a part of their political power in their communities ....").
55. See Kuenyehia, supra note 36, at 387-88 (describing legal pluralism).
56. Bond, supra note 12, at 182.
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this day, however, the majority of indigenous Africans contract
marriages according to customary law, particularly in rural ar-
eas.
5 7
The plural legal system established under colonial rule cre-
ated difficult choice of law questions. In cases involving two Afri-
cans of different ethnic groups, the courts sometimes had to re-
solve conflicts between customary laws.58 In addition, under this
system, if a white person appealed to the court for resolution of
a family law matter, the court would apply the relevant "re-
ceived" or British law.59 If an African appealed to the court for
the same relief, the courts would apply the relevant customary
law or religious law.6" The colonial powers thus created a plural
system of law in which the determining factor as to the relevant
law was a person's race.6' Rights and duties vary significantly
among the different systems of law, and courts must often decide
which law is applicable. Although not confined to any particular
part of the world, legal pluralism continues to be a defining
characteristic of much of the African Commonwealth today.6 2
In cases involving the indigenous population, the courts ap-
plied customary law unless it was "repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience."63 As such, the British colonial
powers became the arbiters of what was just and moral within
57. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAw & POLICY, supra note 20, at 167 ("Custom-
ary marriages are still pervasive in Anglophone Africa. In Zimbabwe, for example, they
accounted for 82% of marriages. Polygamous marriages occur in each of the countries,
with 36% of women in Nigeria, 29% in Tanzania, and 23% in Ghana being part of such
unions.").
58. See, e.g., KWAME OPOKU, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE IN GHANA: A STUDY IN LEGAL
PLURALISM 5 (1976).
59. See Anne Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Op-
tions and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 635, 636 (2000)
(discussing the dual legal systems of former European colonies in Africa, which apply
different laws to different races).
60. See id.
61. See Armstrong et al., supra note 37, at 322 (noting that "customary law applied
to Africans while the received law applied to non-Africans."). As Bart Rwezaura points
out, people in legal disputes tend to invoke whichever system of law is most advanta-
geous in any given situation. See Bart Rwezaura, Tanzania: Building a New Family Law
Out of a Plural Legal System, U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 523, 524-25 (1995). In other words,
a man married according to statutory law may nevertheless claim that customary law
controls in a divorce dispute.
62. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India: Prob-
lems, Prospects, and "Personal Laws," 4 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 181, 181 (2006).
63. Ewelukwa, supra note 45, at 449-50.
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African society,64 creating considerable resentment among the
indigenous African population.65 Despite marked inequalities
between women and men in British colonial society, the colonial
authorities most often invoked the repugnancy clause in an ef-
fort to free African women from what colonialists considered to
be oppressive traditional practices.6 6 This history has contrib-
uted to African skepticism toward the efforts of international
human rights activists to promote women's equality.6 7
During colonial times, "[t] he development of the customary
law was a vital part of African political assertion under colonial-
ism." '68 Because many equated allegiance to custom with politi-
64. At least one commentator has argued that the repugnancy clause was used
primarily to challenge traditional practices related to women and girls, such as early
marriage. See Fareda Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights in Southern Africa, 32 J. S.
AFR. STUD. 13, 14 (2006) (citing CLAIRE PALLEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW
OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1888-1965, at 511 (1966)).
65. See Banda, supra note 44, at 7 (noting that Africans continue to have a resis-
tance to human rights causes as they equate them with the imposition of Western val-
ues).
66. See Chanock, supra note 40, at 77 ("It is also important to avoid any identifica-
tion of a model of a modern, egalitarian, non-sexist and individualistic family and fam-
ily law with the law of Europe and Britain, and its opposite with Africa."). Chanock
further observes:
The early impetus to reform African marriage laws in the name of female
emancipation was replaced by support from the colonial state for the preserva-
tion, and in some cases the extension, of male power. It is important that we
understand the input of the colonial courts and administrators and missiona-
ries into the fashioning of the customary law of marriage, and that we avoid
treating the development of African family law as if it was isolated from the
dominant 'white' system. Once we understand the modern customary law as
the product of this interaction during the colonial period, it again becomes
harder to invoke custom in opposition to reform.
Id.
67. See Banda, supra note 44, at 7. Fareda Banda writes:
It is here worth noting that, to this day, Africans equate human rights and the
need to change customs with that repugnance clause. Indeed part of the
struggle for independence was so that Africans could reclaim their much de-
rided culture, thus the resistance to the perceived re-imposition of European
values in the guise of human rights norms.
Id.
68. Chanock, supra note 40, at 75-76.
Which patterns of behaviour were accepted as legitimate customary law is a
part of the political history of the colonial period and which patterns of beha-
viour are now put forward as representative of custom is likewise a matter of
current politics .... There is a need in modern Africa to recognize and to
respond to the variety of customary traditions regarding family, rather than
simply to continue to cling to, as fully representative of the past, the version
which was able to gain ascendancy during the colonial period.
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cal resistance to British rule, colonialism imbued customary law
with an even greater sense of Africa-ness. In contrast to foreign
occupation, African custom and customary law became an even
greater source of pride and unity. This renewed cultural pride
found pointed expression during the independence period, re-
sulting in an enthusiastic embrace of a new national identity and
corresponding traditional customs immediately following the co-
lonial period.6 9 As Chanock observed almost two decades ago,
" [t] he relatively recent overthrow of the colonial states has made
it an important part of the symbolical politics of modern Africa
to reassert African values and institutions. "70 This allegiance to
custom, as an expression of national identity, continues today
and sometimes takes the form of fundamentalism or radical na-
tionalism.7 1
The end of colonialism brought greater allegiance to cus-
tomary law as it was seen as the legitimate expression of the peo-
ple rather than the law of the state.7 2 Newly independent Afri-
can states thus embraced customary law with renewed vigor
when colonialism ended, and custom and tradition became even
more important symbols of independence and national identity.
It is against this backdrop that the early post-colonial constitu-
tions began to emerge.
Id. at 86.
69. See Banda, supra note 44, at 7 ("[P]art of the struggle for independence was so
that Africans could reclaim their much derided culture. .. ."). Of customary law, Cha-
nock observes:
This misunderstanding has resulted in a notion of customary law which em-
bodies a confusion about both its parts .... If we choose a form of definition
which asserts the essential similarity in form of the law of pre-colonial Africa,
and the customary law of the colonial period, and the imported law of the
colonizers, we make it easier to assert the authenticity of the claims of African
law in the post-colonial period, as these become a matter of revival and exten-
sion. But there is a price to be paid for this, which is that this makes it very
difficult to understand the far-reaching changes which African modes of social
ordering underwent in the twentieth century as a result of being subordinated
to foreign law, and the need to respond to a transformed set of social relation-
ships.
Chanock, supra note 40, at 75.
70. Id. at 72.
71. See Lehnert, supra note 33, at 242.
72. See Chanock, supra note 40, at 72 ("The relatively recent overthrow of the colo-
nial states has made it an important part of the symbolical politics of modem Africa to
reassert African values and institutions.").
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C. Modern Constitutionalism: The Post-Colonial Constitution
And The Reform Era Of The 1990s
British colonial rule largely came to an end in the late
1960s, in a flurry of constitution-making.7 3 The colonial authori-
ties consulted nationalist leaders during the process, and the in-
dependence constitutions were largely a product of this collabo-
ration. 74 Because many of these countries gained independence
in rapid succession, the Colonial Office engaged in rigorous
drafting and logged innumerable hours in the process of making
constitutions. 75  The language of the independence constitu-
tions contains many similarities, suggesting that the lawyers in-
volved did not "reinvent the wheel" with each new constitution.76
"In many African states, initial constitutional provisions were
drawn overwhelmingly from patterns familiar to the departing
colonial power, hence reflecting assumptions far more common
in the metropole than in particular African societies. 77
Many of those drafting similarities appeared in the Bill of
Rights provisions of the independence constitutions. 7' This, to
some extent, explains the recurrent formulation that is the sub-
ject of this Article. Many of the independence constitutions con-
tained some protection of fundamental rights, such as non-dis-
crimination, but specifically excluded personal law from the pur-
view of the constitution.
79
In the period following independence, constitutionalism
simply failed in a number of African states.80 Some commenta-
73. See HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 15.
74. See id. at 18 ("The picture that emerges from the British Government records is
a corrective to the traditional view, reflected in the secondary literature, that Whitehall
imposed the independence constitutions with little or no regard for local conditions
75. See id. at 15 ("At the apogee of the process, the pace of constitutional change
was rapid with independence coming in quick succession to Tanganyika (1961),
Uganda (1962), Kenya (1963), Zanzibar (1963), Northern Rhodesia (1964) and Malawi
(1964) .. .followed by Botswana (1966), Lesotho (1966), and Swaziland (1968).").
76. Id. at 16.
77. Ibhawoh, supra note 38, at 845-46.
78. See HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 16; see also Ibhawoh, supra note 38, at
845 ("Legal recognition and protection of rights in the colonial states of Africa was
belated and inadequate, with constitutions hastily created at independence being in
many cases the first significant expression of them.").
79. See infra notes 88, 93, 94 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of
personal law from constitutions).
80. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of
Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. Rzv. 1239, 1244 (2006).
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tors have suggested that the independence constitutions failed
"not so much [because of] a failure by Africans to learn the les-
son of parliamentary government: rather the lesson of authori-
tarian colonial rule was taught and learnt too well."'" Some of
these nations experienced long periods of military rule and cor-
responding constitutional suspension.8" In others, the focus on
economic development eclipsed any emergent rights dis-
course."' During this time, authoritarian rule characterized
many of these young states.8 4
The 1990s, however, ushered in a new wave of constitution-
alism on the continent.8 5 "Postcolonial Africa's first ever pro-
democracy constitutional moment had finally arrived, and the
1990s would be characterized by vigorous constitution-making
.... "86 Several events served as a catalyst for this "constitutional
moment," including "the ending of the Cold War, the Harare
Commonwealth Declaration's influence and pressure from inter-
national donors through the linking of economic aid with good
governance . .".8.7 As part of the "new constitutionalism" in
Africa, many states amended their constitutions and eliminated
exclusionary clauses in an effort to more fully protect fundamen-
tal human rights.
II. THE CONTOURS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY CLA USES
Despite the wave of constitutional reform in the 1990s, eight
countries in Commonwealth Africa have retained exclusionary
clauses in their constitutions. The constitutions of Botswana,
Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe contain exclusionary provisions.8 8 Although slight
81. Slinn, supra note 16, at 6.
82. See Prempeh, supra note 80, at 1243-44 ("In countries such as Nigeria and
Ghana, where the national experience since the 1960s has been one of an alternating
cycle of (long) military and (short) democratic rule, the current constitutions represent
their fourth or fifth attempt at constitutionalism ... .
83. See id. at 1267.
84. See id. at 1265.
85. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 24, at 1 (referring to "[niew winds" of constitu-
tionalism on the continent).
86. Prempeh, supra note 80, at 1275.
87. HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25, at 22.
88. Botswana, which gained independence from the British in 1966, still retains an
exclusionary clause in its constitution. See BOTS. CONST. s. 15(4) (c) (amended 1997);
HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 25. Despite amendments to the constitution in 1969,
1987, 1996, and 1997, section 15 of the constitution continues to specifically exclude
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variations exist, each country's exclusionary clause is similar in
both form and content. The clause begins with a commitment
to non-discrimination based on articulated grounds."9 Some of
the constitutions in question specifically list sex or gender as a
issues related to "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death
or other matters of personal law" from the protection of the non-discrimination clause.
BoTs. CONST. S. 15(4)(c) (amended 1997).
The first Gambian Constitution was promulgated in 1970 and contained an exclu-
sionary clause. The second and most recent promulgation of the Constitution was in
1996 and incorporated the same exclusionary language in section 33, which states that
the non-discrimination provision shall not apply to "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law." GAMBIA CONST. s. 33
(1997). Ironically, at the same time that the Constitution retained its exclusionary
clause, the 1996 amendments also added broader constitutional protection for women
pursuant to section 28. GAMBIA CONST. s. 28 (1997). This section, entitled "Rights of
Women," states that "[w]omen shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person
with men" and "[w]omen shall have the right to equal treatment with men, including
equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities." Id. It is unclear how
the Gambian courts will resolve the apparent conflict between sections 28 and 33.
Kenya is currently in a period of constitutional transition. Although Kenya's cur-
rent 1999 Constitution retains exclusionary language similar to the Constitutions of
Botswana and Gambia, the new draft Constitution has eliminated the exclusionary
clause. Kenyan voters, however, rejected the draft Constitution in a 2005 referendum.
See Kenyans Reject New Constitution, BBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/africa/4455538.stm. "In 1997, section 82 of the constitution was changed to
outlaw sex discrimination." Kibwana, supra note 15, at 204. As with other exclusionary
clauses, however, Article 82 of the Constitution makes the non-discrimination provision
inapplicable to "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or
other matters of personal law." CONSTITUTION, Art. 82 (1992) (Kenya). By contrast, the
new draft Constitution eliminates Article 82 and includes additional protection for wo-
men in terms of non-discrimination, enumerated protections for women, and property
rights of spouses. The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya, KENYA GAZETTE SUPP.,
Aug. 22, 2005, art. 38. Until the new Constitution is adopted, however, the exclusionary
provision of the current Constitution continues to permit discrimination in family or
personal law areas. Significant opposition remains, however, including from inside the
government. "For example, a minister in the Office of the President Julius L. Sunkuli
has clearly stated that women's civil society groups should not be part of the constitu-
tion making process." Kibwana, supra note 15, at 205.
Similarly, Mauritius amended its Constitution in 1995 with the goal of prohibiting
discrimination based on sex. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observa-
tions of the Human Rights Committee: Mauritius, 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.60
(1996). Despite adding "sex" to the list of prohibited grounds for discrimination in
1995, the Constitution retains its exclusionary clause to date. MAURITIUS CONST. S.
16(3), 16(4) (c) (amended 2001). Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Zimbabwe also retain sim-
ilar exclusionary provisions in their constitutions. SIERRA LEONE CONST. s. 27(4)(d)
(amended 2000); ZAMBIA CONST. (Constitution Act 1991) s. 23(4); ZIMB. CONST. S.
23(3) (amended 2005).
89. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (quoting nearly identical language
from the constitutions of Botswana, Gambia, and Kenya).
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prohibited ground for discrimination.9 ° Others do not.' In
those countries that do not explicitly list sex or gender, however,
women's rights activists have successfully challenged those provi-
sions as implicitly incorporating gender.92
In each of the constitutions with exclusionary clauses, two
different types of exclusionary clauses follow the general non-
discrimination clause. The first clause excludes personal or fam-
ily law, and the second excludes customary law. Although there
is considerable overlap between personal law and customary law,
the exclusionary clauses address them separately.93
Lesotho provides an example.94 Section 18(1) of Lesotho's
Constitution states, "[s]ubject to the provisions of subsections 4
and 5 no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory ei-
90. See, e.g., LESOTHO CONST. S. 18(3) (1993).
91. Interestingly, the non-discrimination provision of the Constitution of Botswana
does not explicitly include gender. It prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race,
tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed .... BoTs. CONST. S. 15(3)
(amended 1997).
92. In the now famous case of Attorney General v. Dow, for example, the Botswana
Court of Appeal held that gender was included in this list of prohibited grounds, albeit
implicitly. See Unity Dow v. Att'y Gen., reprinted in 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 614 (Bots. High Ct.
1991); Lisa Stratton, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws,
77 MINN. L. REV. 195, 231 (1992) (noting the court's observation in Attorney General v.
Dow that "[a] ruling excluding gender from the equal protection provision of the Con-
stitution would not be consistent .. "); VickiJackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational
Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 271, 296-97 (2003)
(stating that the holding in Attorney General v. Dow rejected "a reading of the Botswana
Constitution as excluding protection from gender discrimination."). Although the Dow
case and the concomitant recognition of gender as a prohibited ground for discrimina-
tion was a significant victory for women's rights, the retention of the exclusionary clause
in the Constitution represents a critical obstacle in achieving equal rights for women in
the country.
93. In some countries, for example, a couple may choose to marry according to
statutory, customary, or religious law. See, e.g., Bond, supra note 12, at 182. If a woman
married under the statutory law, a hypothetical discrimination claim related to her di-
vorce would be banned from constitutional consideration by the exclusion of personal
law from the constitution. If a woman, who was married according to customary law,
asserted the same claim, her claim would be excluded under both the exclusionary
clause for personal law and the exclusionary clause for customary law.
94. Lesotho retains an exclusionary clause despite the fact that the country adop-
ted a new Constitution in 1993, after twenty-three years of operating under a suspended
independence constitution. See LESOTHO CONST. s. 18(4) (1993). Even though the early
1990s brought a wave of equality-based constitutional reform in the Commonwealth,
Lesotho opted to retain its exclusionary clause. As a result, section 18(4) (b) contains
the same language described above, excluding personal law from the protection of the
non-discrimination provision of the Constitution. See id.
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ther of itself or in its effect."95 Subsection 3 then defines "dis-
criminatory" to mean "different treatment to different persons
attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by
race, colour, sex, language, religion .... "96 Subsection 4, which
qualifies the non-discrimination provision, then states:
Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law to the extent that
that law makes provision ... with respect to adoption, mar-
riage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or
other like matters which is the personal law of persons... ; or
(c) for the application of the customary law of Lesotho with
respect to any matter in the case of persons who, under that
law, are subject to that law.9 7
Other countries in the African Commonwealth have elimi-
nated or simply not included exclusionary clauses in their more
recent constitutions.98 Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
and Uganda are examples of African Commonwealth countries
that do not have exclusionary clauses in their constitutions.99
Many of these constitutions are a product of the wave of constitu-
tional reform that passed through the continent in the 1990s. 10'
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MANDATE: PRAGMATIC REASONS
FOR ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES
A. The Convention On The Elimination Of
Discrimination Against Women
International human rights law requires states to eliminate
constitutional exclusionary clauses. Of the eight Common-
wealth African countries that have retained exclusionary clauses,
all have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
95. Id. s. 18(1).
96. Id. s. 18(3).
97. Id. s. 18(1).
98. SarasJagwanth & Christina Murray, "No Nation Can Be Free When One Half of It is
Enslaved". Constitutional Equality for Women in South Africa, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITu-
TIONALJURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 230, 231 (noting that although traditional lead-
ers in South Africa asserted that "gender equality could not extend to traditional sys-
tems," advocates for gender equality prevailed and defeated this attempt to add an ex-
clusionary clause to the new South African Constitution).
99. See, e.g., UGANDA CONST. art. 21(3) (1995). Uganda's non-discrimination pro-
vision contains no exclusionary clause. See id.
100. See Cr. FOR REPRODUCrrvE LAw & POLICY, supra note 20, at 10.
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of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") "' Article 2 (f) of
CEDAW obligates States Parties "to take all appropriate mea-
sures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimina-
tion against women."'1 °2 Article 5 requires States Parties to "mod-
ify the social and cultural patterns of the conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes.
"1 °3
Article 16 of CEDAW requires that States Parties eliminate dis-
crimination against women in "all matters relating to marriage
and family relations."'0 4 The Convention requires application of
constitutional equality guarantees to family or personal law.'0 5
101. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Sept. 3, 1981, art. 5, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. Lesotho ratified
CEDAW with a reservation to Article 2 "to the extent that it conflicts with Lesotho's
constitutional stipulations relative to succession to the throne of the Kingdom of
Lesotho and the law relating to succession to chieftainship." Id.
102. Id. art. 2(f).
103. Id. art. 5.
104. Id. art. 16.
105. See Donna Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework
for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 795, 799-800 (1992). Although not
binding on many of the states that have retained exclusionary clauses, the Protocol to
the African Charter on the Rights of Women also requires elimination of the clauses.
See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (2003) (entered into force
Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter the Protocol]. Articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol, which ad-
dress rights within marriage and divorce, respectively, provide additional support for
the elimination of exclusionary clauses. See id. arts. 6-7. With respect to marriage, Arti-
cle 6 obligates States Parties to enact national legislation that requires the "free and full
consent of both parties," establishes eighteen as the minimum age for marriage for
women, guarantees women nationality rights, establishes marital property rights for wo-
men, and safeguards a number of other rights within marriage. Id. art. 6. Although the
content of these rights is important, the fact that the Protocol imposes an obligation on
states to ensure these rights for all women, regardless of the type of marriage, is perhaps
even more significant. See id. This willingness to apply human rights norms without
deference to culture in the marriage context lends further support to the elimination
of constitutional exclusionary clauses.
In many countries, marriage remains subject to a plurality of laws, meaning that a
woman's rights within marriage may vary significantly depending on the type of mar-
riage into which she has entered. The Protocol supports the enactment of a constitu-
tional non-discrimination standard applicable to marriage and other aspects of per-
sonal law. Article 7, which deals with divorce, also provides minimum standards with
which a State Party must comply and makes no allowances for customary or religious
marriages. See id. art. 7.
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B. Regional Human Rights Law
In addition to CEDAW, regional human rights law supports
this type of constitutional reform.1 °6 African regional human
rights law is instructive for several reasons. First, the continent is
largely viewed as a subject of, rather than a source of, human
rights law.10 7 The region has been plagued by some of the most
intractable human rights problems, and early institutions such as
the Organization of African Unity proved to be ineffective. 108
Nevertheless, African scholars and activists have made enormous
contributions fighting massive human rights violations. 109 The
African Union holds greater promise than its predecessor, and
African scholars and activists have begun to generate a body of
law that responds effectively to these challenges.' This percep-
tion of the region as the "recipient" of human rights law is remi-
niscent of the "received" law during colonialism and masks the
important ways that African human rights activists are contribut-
ing to norm development and internalization in the region."'
Second, partly because of the region's colonial past, some
on the continent view international human rights norms as a
product of a western, hegemonic project." 2 This is, in my view,
an inaccurate perception of the contributions and potential of
international human rights law. Nevertheless, regional human
rights mechanisms offer another source of human rights law that
may be viewed with less skepticism than international sources of
law.
1 3
106. See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text (discussing regional efforts to
eliminate discrimination against women).
107. See Jeremy I. Levitt, Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law, 98
Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 231, 231 (2004) ("African states, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and civil society institutions have contributed to the evolution of the corpus of
international law by confirming the existence of norms through formal and informal
law-making processes and have been fashioning new regimes through state practice and
treaty making.").
108. See Wing & Smith, supra note 34, at 54-56.
109. See Bond, supra note 12, at 3-11.
110. See Wing & Smith, supra note 34, at 66-79.
111. See Adrien Wing, Jeremy Levitt, & CraigJackson, The African Union and the New
Pan-Africanism: Rushing to Organize or Timely Shift?, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 1 (2003) ("In the Western hemisphere, Africa is frequently viewed as a basket case
and 'welfare continent' rather than a market place and exporter of values and
norms.").
112. See Banda, supra note 44, at 3 (discussing Shiuji's thoughts on the human
rights agenda).
113. See id. at 5, 6, 13; Sebastian Maguire, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities in
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Third, African women rights activists, like their colleagues
around the world, have grappled with the question of how best
to protect women's rights while simultaneously protecting rights
to culture and religion. In November 2005, the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women (the "Protocol"), a progressive document that articu-
lates a wide range of women's human rights, came into force." 4
The document, which African women's rights organizations
played a significant role in drafting, represents a balance be-
tween the preservation of custom and the embrace of gender
equality. Despite an articulated commitment to preserving the
positive aspects of culture, the Protocol explicitly subjects mar-
riage and family law to equality standards and preserves a voice
for women in the establishment and interpretation of cultural
policies.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
"Charter") offers protection for women's rights within countries
that have ratified the Charter.'1 5 Article 18 of the Charter calls
on States Parties to ensure the "elimination of every discrimina-
tion against women and also ensure the protection of the rights
of the woman and the child as stipulated in international decla-
rations and conventions." '116 The Protocol on the Rights of Wo-
men was designed to supplement the women's rights provisions
of the Charter and to enhance the protection offered by the
Charter.i 7
Because most of the countries that have retained an exclu-
sionary provision in their constitutions have not ratified the Pro-
Afica, 35 CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 1, 40 (2004) (suggesting that "[d]evelopments at the re-
gional level are ... less likely to encounter resistance based on cultural relativist argu-
ments ... [when] the debate between universality and cultural relativism is ... carried
out in regional human rights systems that have a more nuanced understanding of and
sensitivity to the concerns of constituent states.").
114. As ofJanuary 2006, the following countries had ratified the Protocol: Benin,
Cape Verde, The Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Togo. See Equality
Now, Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, http://www.equalitynow.org/en-
glish/campaigns/african-protocol/african-protocol-en.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
115. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
116. Id. art. 18.
117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (pointing out various ways that the
Protocol advances the rights of women).
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tocol, it is not legally binding on those countries." 8 The Proto-
col, nevertheless, represents a critical articulation of African wo-
men's human rights.'19 Because African women played a
significant role in the drafting of the Protocol, it is less suscepti-
ble to the criticisms often leveled at human rights advocates,
namely that they seek to impose a Western view of rights upon
the African continent.
120
The Protocol represents a far-reaching statement of wo-
men's rights on the continent. 2' Article 2 of the Protocol
unambiguously obligates States that have ratified the Protocol to
"combat all forms of discrimination against women through ap-
propriate legislative, institutional and other measures."' 2 9 The
provision specifies that States Parties shall: "include in their na-
tional constitutions and other legislative instruments . . . the
principle of equality between women and men and ensure its
effective application." '23 This obligation to promote equality
through the national constitution suggests that eliminating the
exclusionary provisions would further the objectives of the Pro-
tocol.
A number of other provisions refer, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, to the obligation of a State Party to protect against dis-
crimination even if the non-discrimination right encroaches on
other rights such as cultural rights. 1 24 Specifically, Article 2 re-
fers to the obligation to enact legislation "curbing all forms of
discrimination particularly those harmful practices which endan-
ger the health and general well-being of women."1 25 Article 5 of
the Protocol also obligates States Parties to eliminate harmful
118. See supra note 114 (listing the countries that have ratified the Protocol). See
generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
119. See Wing & Smith, supra note 34, at 78 (calling the Protocol "the most promis-
ing vehicle at the AU's disposal for promoting and protecting African women's
rights.").
120. A determined cultural relativist might still claim that those African women
were influenced by a western notion of rights, undermining their credibility as activists
and agents of change.
121. See Wing & Smith, supra note 34, at 79.
122. Protocol, supra note 105, art. 2.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., id. art. 5 (discussing the elimination of harmful practices against wo-
men in both private and public spheres).
125. Id.
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practices.1 2 6 The reference to "harmful practices" suggests that
there is a subset of cultural or traditional practices that are
harmful to women. 127  Because harmful practices sometimes
thrive in the personal and customary arena, 128 exempting such
practices from constitutional scrutiny hurts women and violates
the spirit of both Articles 2 and 5.129 Under the language of the
Protocol, a non-discrimination provision that excludes personal
and customary law would not be acceptable.1 30 This subset of
harmful cultural practices should, at a minimum, be subject to
equality guarantees-whether they are international, regional, or
domestic.
Articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol, which address rights within
marriage and divorce, respectively, provide additional support
for the elimination of exclusionary clauses.1 3 1 In many coun-
tries, including those that have retained exclusionary clauses in
their constitutions, marriage remains subject to a plurality of
laws, meaning that a woman's rights within marriage may vary
significantly depending on the type of marriage into which she
has entered.'3 2 With respect to marriage, Article 6 obligates
States Parties to enact national legislation that requires the "free
and full consent of both parties," establishes eighteen years as
126. Id.
127. Harmful practices should not be equated with cultural practices. Sie Radhika
Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment
of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 483, 493-94 (2002) (distinguishing cultural prac-
tices that cause pain and suffering). Doing so creates the misimpression that all cul-
tural practices are harmful to women, thereby perpetuating the stereotype that women
from the global south are purely victims of culture. See id. at 513. This elides the fact
that women in the global north are also victims of culture and ignores the agency the
women in the global south exert to define positive culture and resist negative forms of
culture. See id. ("The legacy of a colonial paternalism that posits the third world female
as victim still triggers a great deal of resentment even among those who are generally
favorable to women's rights.").
128. See, e.g., Wing & Smith, supra note 34, at 39 (discussing, inter alia, child mar-
riage, sororate marriage, and bride price).
129. See, e.g., Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women, 1 AFR. HUM. RTs. L.J.
40, 43-45 (2001) (analyzing the scope of the articles of the Protocol that address the
elimination of discrimination and harmful practices against women).
130. See id. at 49 (stating that the Protocol emphasizes the role of women by eradi-
cating "negative cultural practices" and by "promoting positive ones . . . especially in
very traditional societies... [where] women have played a role in the continuation of
negative practices that affect them.").
131. See Protocol, supra note 105, arts. 6-7.
132. See Bond, supra note 12, at 182.
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the minimum age for marriage for women, guarantees women
nationality rights, establishes marital property rights for women,
and safeguards a number of other rights within marriage.13 3 Al-
though the content of these rights is important, the fact that the
Protocol imposes an obligation on States to ensure these rights
for all women, regardless of whether they have married according to
statutory, customary, or religious law, is perhaps even more signifi-
cant. 134 Similarly, Article 7, which deals with divorce, also pro-
vides minimum standards with which a state party must comply
and makes no allowances for customary or religious marriages.
This willingness to apply human rights norms without deference
to culture in the marriage context further supports the elimina-
tion of constitutional exclusionary clauses.1 35
IV. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ELIMINATING
EXCLUSIONARY CLA USES: RECONCILING CUSTOMARY
LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Accommodating Multiculturalism And Gender
Human rights activists have embraced the concept of uni-
versalism in an effort to ensure that all people enjoy fundamen-
tal human rights regardless of their national, ethnic, cultural, or
other affiliation.1"6 Relativists, by contrast, have argued that it
may be necessary to deviate from basic human rights standards
depending on the cultural context. 137 The debate has been
highly polarized and largely unproductive. Nowhere is this more
pronounced than in the debate over women's human rights.1 3 1
133. Protocol, supra note 105, art. 6.
134. The potential benefit and harm of a uniform marriage law in any of the coun-
tries discussed is outside the scope of this Article. Articles 6 and 7, however, demon-
strate a commitment to applying human rights norms without deference to cultural law
or practice.
135. See ANNE-MARIE MOONEY COTTER, GENDER INJUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EQUALIrY IN EMPLOYMENT 122 (2004) ("On the issue of marriage,
Article 7 guarantees that State Parties shall ensure that man and women enjoy equal
rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage . .. [and States Parties] shall
enact appropriate national legislative measures to ensure that during her marriage, the
women shall have the right to acquire her own property . . ").
136. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 92 (stating that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights "embraced the assumption of the universality of human rights.").
137. See id. at 95 ("Opposing the various theories offered as justifications for the
existence of universal human rights, cultural relativism reflects skepticism about the
availability of universal norms.").
138. See Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
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In response to the perceived conflict between women's
equality rights and the preservation of culture, Susan Moller
Okin, in 1999, posed the question Is Multiculturalism Bad for Wo-
men?139 Okin's question provoked considerable response from
feminists both sympathetic to and antagonistic of the efforts of
multiculturalists. 4 ° Professor Leti Volpp cogently argues that it
is misrepresentative to characterize the relationship between
gender equality and culture as oppositional.1 41
The binary construction of multiculturalism versus equality
is objectionable on several grounds. First, it leads to the view
that women are either victims of an oppressive culture (as in the
global south) or beneficiaries of relative equality (as in the
global north). 42 It elides the many ways that women in the
global south resist oppression on a daily basis and the ways that
women in the global north succumb to it. Second, the binarism
encourages women to align themselves on one side of the pur-
ported divide. Women must, in other words, identify as either
gendered beings or cultured beings-but not both. 4 ' This ap-
proach ignores the reality that the vast majority of the world's
women enjoy membership in ethnic, religious, and cultural com-
munities. As such, feminists and multiculturalists must employ a
more complex analysis that values and accommodates both mul-
ticulturalism and gender equality. 144
In the context of the constitutional exclusionary provisions
Exploration of Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 71-76
(2003).
139. See Okin, supra note 2.
140. See BENHABIB, supra note 3, at 86.
141. "To posit feminism and multiculturalism as oppositional is to assume that
minority women are victims of their cultures." Volpp, supra note 26, at 1181; see also,
Higgins, supra note 1, at 103-04.
142. See Volpp, supra note 26, at 1185 ("This is due to the assumption that non-
Western women are situated within cultural contexts that require their subordination,
achieved by a discursive strategy that constructs gender subordination as integral to
their culture.").
143. See id. at 1199 ("[T]he assumption in the discourse of feminism versus mul-
ticulturalism is that women can live their lives only as women, rather than as parts of
other communities, so that their subjectivity is constructed only by gender."); see also
Bond, supra note 138.
144. As Madhavi Sunder observes with respect to women's equality and religious
freedom, "[riather than accepting the binary framework of religion (on traditional
leaders' terms) or rights (without normative community), activists are developing strate-
gies and new human rights theory that enable women to claim freedom and equality
within the context of normative community." Sunder, supra note 7, at 1406.
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described above, the colonial powers determined that it was in
their interest to preserve multiculturalism at the expense of gen-
der equality. 45 Akua Kuenyehia observes, "[c]olonial adminis-
trators put up with customary law so long as natives used it to
regulate matters among themselves and their actions did not
threaten colonial rule."'4 6 In an effort to facilitate colonial ad-
ministration, the colonial authorities ceded power over the "pri-
vate" realm of family law and allowed local, indigenous authori-
ties to resolve disputes involving family or customary law.
B. Public/Private Dichotomy
States and liberal theorists often maintain a distinction be-
tween the public realm, in which legal regulation is deemed nat-
ural and appropriate, and the private realm, in which such regu-
lation is deemed offensive to individualist notions of privacy."'
The "public" or "private" designation is politically meaningful.14 8
Depending on which side of the dichotomy a particular activity
falls, it will either be imbued with a sense of public importance
and corresponding state regulation or triviality and correspond-
ing deference to privacy and particularity.149 Liberal theory has
primarily concerned itself with abuses of state power rather than
abuses of private power.15° The realm of the public thus be-
comes the primary subject of public discourse and scrutiny; the
realm of the private remains sheltered from public debate.15" '
For two decades, feminist scholars have been working to dis-
145. See Kuenyehia, supra note 36, at 389.
146. Id.
147. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POL'V & L. 13, 20 (2005).
148. See id.
149. See BENHABIB, supra note 3, at 85.
150. SeeJames Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence
of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 394 (1993) ("Many
flavors of liberal state theory take as definitionally true that abuses of public power are
more to be feared than abuses of private power ... that autonomy is more legitimately
the concern of the state than equality"). The private sphere, inhabited by women and
families, has historically been accorded less value than the masculine public sphere of
the "work place, the law, economics, politics and intellectual and cultural life." Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International
Law, 85 Am.J. Irr'L L. 613, 626 (1991).
151. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory's Role in
New Legal Realism, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 405, 414 (2005).
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mantle the public/private dichotomy. 15 2 Feminists have argued
that shielding the private sphere from public scrutiny serves to
perpetuate male domination in the family.1 53 In the United
States, feminists have demonstrated how domestic violence and
sexual violence in the home harm women and require state in-
tervention.
5 4
In the international context, feminists have successfully
challenged the traditional focus of the international human
rights movement on public or state action. 15  Historically, the
human rights community challenged actions by the state that in-
truded on individual (male) rights against arbitrary state inter-
vention.156 Civil and political rights were constructed as public
rights and enjoyed a privileged status within the hierarchy of
human rights. 15
7
By the 1990s, international feminists had transformed
human rights law in a profound way. The traditional focus on
states that violated human rights through state-sponsored "pub-
lic" acts gave way to an expanded notion of state accountability
for human rights.1 58 The expanded doctrine of state responsibil-
ity holds states accountable for systemically failing to act with
due diligence to prevent, investigate, or punish the acts of pri-
vate actors.159 As such, the human rights community began to
offer hope to victims of violence within the private sphere as well
152. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACK1NNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(1989).
153. Tracey E. Higgins, Why Feminists Can't (Or Shouldn't) Be Liberals, 72 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2004).
154. See, e.g., ELIZABETH SCHNIEDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000).
155. See Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 14 (Julie Pe-
ters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) ("The distinction between private and public is a
dichotomy largely used to justify female subordination and to exclude human rights
abuses in the home from public scrutiny.").
156. See Bond, supra note 138, at 88-89.
157. See Dorothy Thomas, In Defense of the Civil and Political Rights of Women, in
FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS 42 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1995) ("The critique of
this public/private distinction and thus of the gendered character of traditional con-
cepts of civil and political rights, challenges the historical primacy of these rights as
well.").
158. See Bond, supra note 138, at 88-90.
159. See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A.
Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20,
1993).
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as victims of state violence in the public sphere. 6 ° Within inter-
national human rights discourse, this dismantling of the public
and private spheres indicated an international consensus that
the private realm should enjoy the same level of scrutiny as the
public realm.
The dismantling of the public/private dichotomy, however,
is incomplete both in theory and practice. Although the family
is viewed as private, states around the world continue to vigor-
ously regulate it.16 l In many parts of the world, for example, the
state regulates family form. 16 2 State regulation determines who
qualifies as a family and, as a corollary, who benefits from that
status. 163 In much of Commonwealth Africa, the state is actively
involved in choice of law questions concerning the family. 164 In
other words, even a family dispute that is controlled by custom-
ary law rather than statutory law may require a judicial determi-
nation to that effect.
165
In addition to resolving choice of law questions concerning
family law, the state actively constructs and reconstructs the pub-
lic/private divide through legislation.' 66 In countries that have
retained constitutional exclusionary clauses, for example, the
state has carved out areas of law that are considered "personal"
or "private" and are not subject to constitutional scrutiny. This
distinction between public and private was enshrined in the in-
dependence constitutions when the non-discrimination provi-
sions were drafted to specifically exclude personal or family law
from protection. 1
67
160. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Fur-
ther Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the
Question of the Programme and Methods of Work for the Commission, 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1996/53/Add.2 (February 2, 2006) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
161. See generally Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 307 (2004).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (describing plural legal systems).
165. See generally John W. van Doren, Death African Style: The Case of S. M. Otieno, 36
AM. J. COMp. L. 329 (1998).
166. Remarking on the state's role in maintaining the public/private distinction,
Martha Fineman observes, "[b]y scooping out what is public, [the state] also defines
what remains public." Fineman, supra note 151, at 412.
167. Indeed, as Madhavi Sunder observes concerning religious law, "[t]he revolu-
tionary concept of enlightenment was acceptable precisely because it did not reject, but
rather cabined, religion, attempting to control religious passions by carefully tucking
them away in the private sphere." Sunder, supra note 7, at 1418.
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During the colonial and independence periods, however,
this critique of the public/private split had yet to take hold.
While the colonial authorities expressed no hesitation regarding
legislating in the public sphere, they readily carved out the
realm of family and personal law as an area that was simply less
important and one into which they would not intrude. 168 Femi-
nist scholars have demonstrated, however, that the law actively
constructs the private sphere even while professing non-interfer-
ence. 69 Sunder observes, "[i]n ceding complete authority to re-
ligion without subjecting it to tests of rationality and legitimacy,
law plays a far more active role in defending a particular concep-
tion of religion and, ultimately, in obstructing change."17 ° Al-
though Sunder refers to religion here, in the context of Com-
monwealth Africa, the law plays an equally active role in con-
structing culture and customary law as patriarchal systems by
refusing to subject these areas to constitutional non-discrimina-
tion law.
For many years, feminist scholars and activists have exposed
as faulty the construction of distinct spheres of public and pri-
vate. Feminists have also long criticized the prioritization of the
public sphere over the private sphere, collapsing the categories
and emphasizing their interrelatedness.17' In the case of consti-
tutional exclusionary clauses, the state is, therefore, actively
maintaining a dichotomy that has been discredited by feminists
for decades.
Feminists have also demonstrated the gendered nature of
law.17 2 Feminists around the world have demonstrated how
facially neutral laws can have a disproportionate effect on wo-
men, making them discriminatory in application or effect.' 7 3
The exclusionary clauses are facially neutral.' They exclude
matters related to: "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolu-
168. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 150, at 627 (" [T] he law has always operated
primarily within the public domain; it is considered appropriate to regulate the work
place, the economy and the distribution of political power, while direct state interven-
tion in the family and the home has long been regarded as inappropriate.").
169. See id.
170. Sunder, supra note 7, at 1420-21.
171. See generally Charlesworth et. al., supra note 150.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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tion of property, or other matters of personal law." t7 5 In each of
these constitutions, there is another exclusion for customary
law.176 Both exclusionary clauses have a disproportionately neg-
ative effect on women. The areas of the law carved out in the
exclusionary provisions are those areas that most commonly af-
fect women in their relationships with children, spouses, and
parents. In addition, customary law continues to govern the le-
gal disputes of the vast majority of women in these countries,
applying almost uniformly in rural areas. Familial rights for
these women are thus doubly excluded from constitutional pro-
tection. As Catharine MacKinnon has observed with respect to
personal laws in India, "[o] nce it is recognized that the family is
a terrain of sex inequality, calling the law of that arena personal
is revealed as little more than a way of precluding women's asser-
tion of equality there." '177 Rather than impose a non-discrimina-
tion standard in the private sphere, the exclusionary clauses im-
pose the public/private divide onto definitions of equality and
non-discrimination. 178
The feminist critique alone does not adequately explain the
exclusion of personal and customary law from the post-colonial
constitutional domain. Racism and Eurocentrism also played an
important role in rendering African personal law external to the
constitution. As Achille Mbembe observes in describing the sta-
tus of the colonized or the "native," "[c] onsigned unilaterally to
a sort of minority without foreseeable end, he/she cannot be a
subject of politics, a citizen." '79 The colonial powers perceived
the colonial subject as unworthy of law. The African woman is
thus located at the intersection of mutually reinforcing colonial
biases: the belief that the African colonized subject is unworthy
of the public sphere of law; and the belief that women must oc-
cupy the private sphere free from state intervention.
175. See, e.g., LESOTHO CONST., s. 18(4) (1993).
176. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
177. MacKinnon, supra note 62, at 197.
178. Tracey Higgins makes this point in a slightly different context. Discussing the
limitations of Rawlsian liberalism, Higgins observes: "The response, too often, is not to
extend the principle of equality fully into the private realm, but to extend the public/
private boundary into the definition of equality." Higgins, supra note 153, at 164041.
179. ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE PosrcoLoNy 35 (2001).
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C. Dialogic Constitutionalism and Women's Agency
Some feminists would undoubtedly advocate eliminating
customary law in its entirety.1 80 Although appealing in its sim-
plicity, such an approach would generate little positive change
for women and would create a harmful backlash against efforts
to ensure women's equality."' 1 In addition, it would harm wo-
men who enjoy the positive aspects of membership in their cul-
tural communities and who embrace the non-discriminatory as-
pects of customary law.18 2
Instead, women who live in those countries that have re-
tained exclusionary provisions must have a voice in defining the
content of customary and personal law. One of the best ways to
ensure that women have a voice in the development of custom-
ary and personal law is to subject such laws to constitutional scru-
tiny. In this way, women who challenge customary or personal
law are participants in and initiators of a dialogue that will shape
the contours of customary law and gender equality law. Women
will have a role in the preservation of custom, but one that also
allows them to redefine customary and personal law consistent
with constitutional equality norms.
Theories of dialogic constitutionalism offer support for en-
suring that women have a voice in the development of constitu-
tional equality norms. Although most theorists have focused on
the constitutional dialogue that occurs (or should occur) be-
tween courts and the legislative branch, some have expanded
the scope of the dialogic inquiry to include other constitutional
actors. 8 Construed broadly, the category of constitutional ac-
180. Celestine Nyamu refers to this approach as the abolitionist approach. She
observes, "[slome critics have pointed out that these abolitionist responses create the
impression that women's rights do not exist in custom or local practice .... " Celestine
I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of
Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARv. Ir'L L.J. 381, 393 (2000).
181. See id. at 393-94.
182. See id.
183. See Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of
Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BRooK. L. REv. 1109, 1109 (2006). In describing
theories of constitutional dialogue, Bateup states, "when exercising the power ofjudi-
cial review, judges engage in an interactive, interconnected and dialectical conversation
about constitutional meaning. In short, constitutional judgments are, or ideally should
be, produced through a process of shared elaboration between the judiciary and other
constitutional actors." Id.
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tors includes women seeking to challenge and redefine discrimi-
natory personal and customary laws.
For over a century, scholars in the United States have been
concerned that judicial review is anti-democratic and leads to
the "countermajoritarian difficulty." t84 Dialogue theories have
gained currency in recent years as a response to concerns about
democratic legitimacy.18 Dialogue theorists recognize that
judges are not the exclusive arbiters of constitutional mean-
ing.186 They suggest that it is the dialogue between judges, legis-
latures, and citizens that determines constitutional meaning.1 8 7
Although much dialogue theory has focused on the U.S. Consti-
tution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, many
of its insights apply in other regions of the world.1 8
8
Barry Friedman, among others, has recognized that popular
opinion informs constitutional dialogue.189 This version of dia-
logue theory values both the judicial resolution of constitutional
questions and the resulting public dialogue that engages the
people in resolving contested questions of constitutional mean-
ing."' Christine Bateup also supports a more expansive, positive
account of dialogue theory, one which promotes and values the
society-wide dialogue that informs and is informed by constitu-
tional interpretation. 91
Christine Bateup observes, "[t]he best way to . foster the
legitimacy of constitutional commitments to rights as important
expressions of a nation's self-understanding may well be adapt-
ing or designing systems of constitutional dialogue in a way that
184. Id. at 1113.
185. See id. at 1118.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1122.
188. See id. at 1109-11.
189. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MicH. L. REv. 577, 645
(1993).
190. Christine Bateup, Expanding the Conversation: American and Canadian Exper-
iences of Constitutional Dialogue in Comparative Perspective, 21 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 1,
20 (2007). Bateup remarks: "On this understanding, judicial decisions are important
not only because of what judges say about the resolution of constitutional issues, but
also because when judges decide cases they spark (or continue) a broader societal dis-
cussion about constitutional meaning." Id.
191. Bateup observes, "[t]he ultimate effect is to preserve popular input into con-
stitutional debate, thereby ensuring that the Constitution is owned by the people, and
that society as a whole plays a role in working out its fundamental commitments." Id. at
22.
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recognizes the central place of the people in ongoing discussion
about fundamental values."192 The first step in any such dia-
logue regarding women's rights under personal or family law is a
constitutional amendment that brings these laws within the pur-
view of the constitution. Only then can a meaningful dialogue
about the normative values of equality and culture take hold.
Constitutional scrutiny is a catalyst for constitutional dialogue.
The process of constitutional amendment itself can initiate
society-wide dialogue.193 When the National Resistance Move-
ment Government assumed power in Uganda in 1986, for exam-
ple, it engaged in a nationwide inquiry to both assess the peo-
ple's views concerning a new constitution and to raise public
awareness of constitutionalism.' 94 The efforts of the government
to seek popular consensus on the constitution and its norms led
to increased legitimacy of the document. In 1993, when South
Africa began drafting its post-apartheid constitution, the nature
and breadth of the gender equality provisions represented a sig-
nificant battleground. 95 Traditional leaders fought to include
an exclusionary clause that would place personal and customary
law outside the purview of non-discrimination protection. 96 Al-
though this effort was defeated, the public controversy raised
consciousness about the issue and set the stage for the Constitu-
tional Court to later resolve conflicts between customary law and
constitutional equality guarantees.197
Some advocates negotiating a middle path between asser-
192. Bateup, supra note 183, at 1166.
193. See generally Reva Seigel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Con-
stitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
194. Hatchard, Ndulo, and Slinn observe:
In an effort to address past horrors and to establish constitutional stability, the
National Resistance Government upon assuming power in 1986 gave the peo-
ple of Uganda an opportunity to make their new constitution. A twenty-one
member Constitutional Commission was established that toured the country
obtaining the public's view through a series of seminars, workshops, debates
and discussions. Efforts to sensitize the public to pertinent constitutional is-
sues were spearheaded by a user-friendly publication entitled Guidelines on
Constitutional Issues. As a result, the Commission received 25,542 submissions
and, based on these, it proceeded to produce a draft constitution.
HATCHARD, ET AL., supra note 25, at 29.
195. SeeJagwanth & Murray, supra note 98, at 230.
196. See id. at 231 ("This approach would have excluded the majority of South
African women from the benefit of an equality clause in the crucial areas of family law,
inheritance, and property ownership.").
197. See infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
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tions of cultural rights and gender equality have argued for the
necessity of internal dialogue and cross-cultural collaboration.
In Abdullahi An-Na'im's formulation, internal dialogue regard-
ing the meaning of norms creates legitimacy and local support
for those norms. 198 Without this legitimacy, the standards will
mean little. 99 Cross-cultural collaboration complements this in-
ternal process by providing a dialogue across national borders
that will inform the normative content of rights at the interna-
tional level.200 It is, however, the internal dialogue portion of
the equation with which I am concerned here. The elimination
of exclusionary clauses will further the internal dialogue in two
significant ways. First, the process of amending the constitution
to eliminate the exclusionary clauses will spark critical local and
national debate concerning women's rights within different re-
ligious and cultural communities. Second, the eventual elimina-
tion of the exclusionary clauses will allow women, as constitu-
tional actors and litigants, to initiate society-wide dialogue con-
cerning how best to define custom in a way that reflects
constitutional equality norms.
The move toward constitutionalization is not without con-
troversy. This increased constitutionalism, and corresponding
judicial review, 21 has led some to conclude that the shift from
traditional democratic, representative institutions toward judi-
cial enforcement of constitutional rights represents a "democ-
racy deficit. '20 2 Proponents of this increased focus on constitu-
tionalism maintain that judicial review provides a critical check
on majoritarian power. In contrast, critics assert that constitu-
198. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining Inter-
national Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR
CONSENSUS 19-21 (An-Nai'm ed., 1992).
199. See id.
200. For a discussion of the willingness to apply international human rights norms
within Africa, see Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative
Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH.J. INT'L L. 103, 137
(2002).
201. See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2004). Hirschl observes: "Around the globe,. . . funda-
mental constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from
representative institutions to judiciaries." He adds, "[t]his global trend toward the ex-
pansion of the judicial domain is arguably one of the most significant developments in
late twentieth and early twenty-first century government." Id.
202. Bateup, supra note 183, at 1114.
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tionalism shifts power away from institutions of representational
democracy, such as the national legislature, creating instead a
'juristocracy." 20 ' The renewed interest in constitutionalism in
Commonwealth Africa in the 1990s is, however, partly a response
to authoritarian leadership, and the corresponding absence of
democracy, in a number of African countries in the 1970s and
1980s.2 °4
It is no coincidence that the rise in constitutionalism oc-
curred contemporaneously with the dramatic ascendancy of
human rights as a foundational principle in the latter half of this
century. 20 5 In much of post-colonial Africa, newly independent
governments have enthusiastically embraced the primacy of
human rights, at least on paper. The experience of oppression
by the colonial authorities and, in some countries, by post-colo-
nial authoritarian leaders has undoubtedly increased receptivity
toward the constitutionalization of human rights in the re-
gion.20 6 Many South Africans, for example, take great pride in
their new Constitution and its rejection of oppressive policies in
favor of steadfast human rights guarantees.20 7
Rather than creating a democratic deficit, the new constitu-
tionalism affords greater, albeit different, access to public debate
and norm definition. Courts with judicial review limit
majoritarian policy-making and safeguard access to constitu-
tional litigation, which "facilitate[s] the political representation
of diffuse but well-organized minorities. '' 20 8 Similarly, this new
emphasis on the constitutionalization of human rights creates
203. "Juristocracy" is Ran Hirschl's term for this shift in power and increased focus
on constitutionalism at the expense of democratic politics. See id. at 73.
204. Hatchard, Ndulo, and Slinn observe:
Many governments that emerged after independence soon became undemo-
cratic, over-centralised and authoritarian. Predictably, political monopolies
led to corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. Presidents (or Kings) re-
placed the colonial governor in fact and in deeds. This often led to the emer-
gence of repressive one-party systems of government with the constitution be-
ing amended or re-made to reflect the new reality.
HATCHARD, ET AL., supra note 25, at 19.
205. See Hirschl, supra note 201, at 75.
206. See generally HATCHARD, ET AL., supra note 25.
207. See id.
208. Hirschl, supra note 201, at 78. It should be noted that Hirschl does not sub-
scribe to this view but is merely describing the position of other commentators. In
describing those views, Hirschl observes, "[t]his representation creates opportunities
for certain groups to participate in policy-making processes that might otherwise be
closed to them in majoritarian politics." Id.
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new opportunities for individuals to exercise agency in the pur-
suit and enforcement of those rights. 20 9 In Commonwealth Af-
rica, the opportunity for women to exercise constitutional
agency to challenge discriminatory personal or customary laws is
crucial to the realization of women's rights in the region. Be-
cause it dramatically affects women's legal and economic rela-
tionships with spouses, parents, and children, personal and cus-
tomary law is the lynchpin for gender equality. As such, allowing
women a voice in determining its content and parameters will
improve women's status in their homes and in their communi-
ties, leading to increased participation in traditional democratic
forums.
Critics, alleging that the new constitutionalism creates a de-
mocracy deficit, typically assert that the legislature allows for
greater participation through the legislative process.210 In the
case of African customary law, however, those assertions become
less relevant. In post-colonial Commonwealth Africa, traditional
male leaders still play a significant role in determining and inter-
preting cultural norms and customary law.211 Unlike the system
of representative government, however, these are not standard
representative roles. 2 12 Although traditional chiefs may have the
interests of individual community members in mind, the system
is not set up to be a formal system of representation, which
would provide a "voice" for the politically less powerful.213 Un-
like legislation, customary law is passed down through the gener-
ations and offers little to no opportunity for women to voice op-
position or support for a particular interpretation of customary
law. Judicial examination of customary law against constitu-
tional standards, then, has less bearing on the democracy deficit
question than does judicial review of legislation passed by parlia-
ment.
209. See DavidJacobson & Galya Benarieh Ruffer, Courts Across Borders: The Implica-
tions of Judicial Agency for Human Rights and Democracy, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 74, 75 (2003)
(noting "[t]he notion of collective 'authorship,' or deliberation, through the republi-
can model fails to capture the force of the individual, as 'agent,' as a primary form of
political engagement in current patterns of governance").
210. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 3 (2004).
211. Carolyn Dempster, Traditional Chiefs Flex Their Muscles, BBC NEWS, Oct. 4,
2000, http://news.bbc.co.ok/2/hi/africa/956075.stm.
212. There are a few exceptions to this. Some ethnic groups had traditional coun-
cils that functioned as a quasi-legislative body.
213. See Dempster, supra note 211.
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A recent Constitutional Court case in South Africa illus-
trates the potential for women to initiate constitutional dialogue
concerning the normative content of customary law and gender
equality law. Prior to the promulgation of the new South Afri-
can Constitution, South African feminists defeated an attempt by
traditional leaders to insert an exclusionary clause into the Bill
of Rights.2 1 4 Because this attempt was defeated, activists were
later able to use constitutional equality guarantees to bring a
challenge to the discriminatory customary practice of male pri-
mogeniture.2 15 The Constitutional Court's October 2004 deci-
sion in Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha declared section 23 of the
Black Administration Act and the customary law rule of primo-
geniture unconstitutional.2 1 a
In Bhe, a man died intestate, leaving behind a woman with
whom he had lived for twelve years and their two daughters.
The indigent couple lived on a small piece of property and had
saved enough money to buy building materials for a house.
When the man died, the local Magistrate appointed the de-
ceased's father as heir to the estate, pursuant to customary law.
When the deceased's father announced his intentions to sell the
property to cover funeral expenses, leaving Ms. Bhe and her
daughters homeless, she filed an action on behalf of her two
daughters.
Until the Bhe decision, the Black Administration Act gov-
erned the estates of black South Africans who died intestate. 7
The Intestate Succession Act governed the estates of others, 1
establishing an intestate regime that relied explicitly on race to
determine the choice of law. The Constitutional Court deter-
mined that the Black Administration Act was unconstitutional as
"an egregious apartheid law which anachronistically has survived
214. See Marilou McPhedran, Women's Constitutional Activism in Canada and South
Africa, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL PERSPECrIVES (Pene-
lope E. Andrews & Susan Bazilli eds., forthcoming 2007), available at http://www.iwrp.
org/pdf/mmwca.pdf; see also Jill Zimmerman, The Reconstruction of Customary Law in
South Africa: Method and Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACKLErrER L.J. 197, 206 (2001).
215. Activists had been lobbying unsuccessfully for legislation on the issue for
years. See SA Law Commission Issue Paper 3 Harmonisation of the Common Law and
the Indigenous Law (1996).
216. Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 2004 (18) BHRC 52 (CC) (S. Mr.).
217. Id. 1-3 (S. Mr.).
218. Section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act provides, "'Intestate estate'
includes any part of an estate ... in respect of which section 23 of the Black Administra-
tion Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927), does not apply." Id. 39.
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our transition to a non-racial democracy. "219
The Court then considered whether the customary law of
intestate succession violated the Constitution's equality guaran-
tees. Under the customary law principle of male primogeniture,
only a male relative of the deceased may inherit. Traditionally,
the male heir inherited in a representative capacity and
shouldered the burden of providing for the deceased's surviving
family.22° Today, however, the situation has changed. Justice
Langa, writing for the Bhe majority, remarked, "[the heir] ac-
quires the estate without assuming, or even being in a position to
assume, any of the deceased's responsibilities. '221' This often
leaves widows destitute and unable to support their children.
Comparing the customary law rule of male primogeniture to the
equality and dignity guarantees of the Constitution, the Court
concluded that the customary law was a clear violation of the Bill
of Rights.
222
Not surprisingly, Bhe generated considerable controversy.
The case involved a high level of engagement with national wo-
men's rights organizations.223 In a companion case decided
jointly with Bhe, a non-governmental organization called the Wo-
men's Legal Centre Trust and the South African Human Rights
Commission brought an action in the public interest and as a
class action on behalf of all similarly situated women. 224 The
case, which generated a great deal of media attention, contrib-
219. Id. 63 (quoting Western Cape Provincial Gov't & Others: In re DVB Behuising
(Pty) Ltd. v. North West Provincial Gov't 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC); 2000 (4) BCLR 347 (CC)).
220. "The heir did not merely succeed to the assets of the deceased; succession was
not primarily concerned with the distribution of the estate of the deceased, but with the
preservation and perpetuation of the family unit." Id. 76.
221. Id. 80 (citing Chihowa v. Mangwende 1987 1 ZLR 228 (SC) 233-4E).
222. "It is a form of discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage
among a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and male domina-
tion incompatible with the guarantee of equality under the constitutional order." Id.
91. Counsel for the applicants, Bhe and her two children, remarked, "[tihe Constitu-
tional Court ruling strikes down the racist apartheid statutory scheme for deceased es-
tates of black persons, as well as the African customary law rule of primogeniture, to the
extent that it excludes or hinders women or extra marital children from inheriting
property." ConCourt Rules Customary Inheritance Laws Unconstitutional, http://www.roy-
law.co.za/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.article&pageD=8922777&ArticleID=8843366
(last visited October 1, 2006).
223. See CATHERINE ALBERTYN, CTR. FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, WOMEN'S RIGHTS 7
(Aug. 2004), available at http://www.genderstats.org.za/documents/Women'sRights.
pdf.
224. Bhe, 18 BHRC 7.
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION AND GENDER
uted to the "broader societal discussion about constitutional
meaning. ' 225 In the case of South Africa, it is also likely that the
feminist advocacy campaign to subject personal and customary
law to constitutional equality provisions years earlier initiated the
society-wide dialogue. The Bhe case represents a continuation of
that dialogue.
The Constitutional Court expressed a noteworthy openness
to constitutional dialogue. The Court invited a response from
the Chairperson of the House of Traditional Leaders in the form
of an amicus curiae, who chose not to respond to the Court's invi-
226tation. Also, the majority opinion explicitly invited the legisla-
ture to respond with appropriate legislation. 227 Although this
"conversation" is not over in South Africa, the Bhe case afforded
women's rights groups the opportunity to actively participate in
the dialogue and to influence the application of equality guaran-
tees to the customary law. This opportunity would not have
arisen had the traditional chiefs prevailed in their struggle to
include exclusionary clauses in the 1994 Constitution.
As such, the case represents significant progress for the
many women who are subject to customary law in South Africa.
It reminds us that when women have the opportunity to pro-
mote gender equality from within their cultural communities,
they will use the constitution, among other things, to do so. The
constitution becomes an important, although not the only, vehi-
cle through which to redefine and reshape cultural meaning, al-
lowing women to challenge dominant cultural norms without
abandoning culture altogether. Constitutional agency thus pro-
vides women a voice and often initiates a societal dialogue about
shared norms and values. South African public institutions and
women's rights groups must now engage in extensive public edu-
cation campaigns to raise awareness about the decision, particu-
larly in rural areas where judges may continue to apply the cus-
225. Bateup, supra note 190, at 20. But see Tracy E. Higgins, Are Women Human?
And Other International Dialogues by Catharine A. Mackinnon, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 523,
535 (2006) (book review) (observing that most women in rural areas had not heard of
the decision nearly a year after it was decided). It is too soon to attempt to gauge the
extent to which the decision and the equality norms it reflects have been internalized.
226. Bhe, 18 BHRC 4.
227. "Any order by this Court should be regarded by the legislature as an interim
measure. It would be undesirable if the order were to be regarded as a permanent
fixture of the customary law of succession." Id. 1 116.
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tomary rule of male primogeniture until the Bhe decision firmly
takes root in the public consciousness.
V. STRATEGIES FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Having demonstrated that constitutional scrutiny is a pre-
condition for dialogic constitutionalism in which women-as
constitutional actors-may challenge and redefine the norma-
tive content of personal and customary law, I turn now to modes
of judicial intervention. Assuming a state amends its constitu-
tion to eliminate personal and customary exclusionary clauses,
how much judicial intervention is justified when evaluating per-
sonal or customary law against constitutional norms? These
methods, which are discussed in turn, include limited interven-
tion, formalist intervention, and activist intervention.22
A. Limited Intervention-Evolution of Customary Law
Customary law is not static.229 Because it evolves over time,
some would argue that limited judicial intervention is the best
course of action. Indeed, attempts by colonial authorities to
codify customary law have contributed to its contemporary mis-
conception as a fixed body of law. In addition to fixing custom-
ary law in time, the colonizers' codification efforts filtered cus-
tomary law through the colonial lens, leading to a corruption of
meaning and perverted understanding of custom.
Many judges and scholars on the continent recognize and
value the changing nature of customary law. They contrast this
flexible, "living" customary law to that enshrined in statutes and
academic texts. Given the evolutionary nature of customary law,
some commentators have argued that it will evolve toward equal-
ity norms over time. 2 11 Proponents of this laissez-faire approach
to customary law will undoubtedly argue for minimal constitu-
tional oversight, preferring to allow evolution to take place at its
own pace.
Legislators could elect to eliminate the exclusionary provi-
sions and yet provide for judicial review of customary and per-
228. This typology builds upon distinctions articulated by Fareda Banda. Banda
distinguishes between the following approaches to customary law: evolutionary, revolu-
tionary, proportionate, and status quo. Banda, supra note 44, at 8.
229. See Armstrong et al., supra note 37, at 324-28.
230. See Banda, supra note 44, at 8.
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sonal law in only limited circumstances. This low level of en-
gagement between customary law and constitutional law, some-
thing akin to rational basis review, would neither satisfy the
requirements of international human rights law nor initiate a
constitutional dialogue that would allow grassroots women to
help determine the normative content of the right to equality in
their homes and personal lives.
B. Formalist Intervention-Rights-Trumping
Another response to the dilemmas posed by customary law
is to establish a clear constitutional regime in which rights to
custom trump equality rights or vice versa. There are several
problems with this approach, however. First, a simple rights-
trumping approach forces women to identify exclusively as ei-
ther a woman or as a member of a cultural minority. For exam-
ple, if the constitutional scheme allows cultural rights to trump
gender rights, equality-seeking women may be forced to exit
from their cultural communities in order to fully enjoy the right
to gender equality. Conversely, if the constitutional scheme priv-
ileges gender to the exclusion of cultural rights, a woman is
again forced to choose between these communities and may, in
fact, forego the exercise of gender equality rights in order to
maintain a connection to her familial or cultural community.
Rights-trumping encourages an all-or-nothing approach to
cultural rights. Many women proudly serve as the protectors of
culture and value the positive aspects of custom and tradition.
These women would seek to modify or eliminate only those as-
pects of culture that are harmful to them.23 ' A rights-trumping
approach forces women to identify as either gendered or cul-
tured, but not both.
The problem with this approach is, at its core, a problem of
international intersectionality. 232 Intersectionality theory, which
surfaced in feminist and anti-racist circles in the 1990s, describes
an understanding of the self as complex, fluctuating, and subject
to multiple sources of oppression and privilege. In other words,
231. See Ewelukwa, supra note 45, at 451. In discussing discriminatory widowhood
rituals, Ewelukwa observes, "[t ] he rule effectively discourages potential legal challenges
by women because it has the effect of pitting women against the custom and the larger
society as women come to be perceived as destroyers of custom." Id.
232. See generally Bond, supra note 138.
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feminist critiques that focus on "women" as a unified category of
analysis-to the exclusion of other sites of oppression such as
race, class, culture, religion, or sexual orientation-fundamen-
tally misunderstand the human condition. Individuals do not
experience "neatly compartmentalized types of discrimination
based on mutually exclusive forms of, for example, racism and
sexism. 233 Instead, people experience the "complex interplay
of multiple systems of oppression operating simultaneously in
the world. 234
Women are often forced to choose between, for example,
nationalist struggles and struggles to achieve gender equality. As
Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar observe in the context of Israel,
"[tlhe tension between manifesting loyalty to their minority
group identity and struggling against their gender-based vulner-
ability has long silenced Arab women."235 This construction of
identity leaves no room for women to situate themselves at the
crossroads of both struggles and lead to oversimplified notions
of women's identity.
Within the human rights community, there has been some
movement away from this binary approach to women's iden-
tity.236 Advocates of an international intersectional approach
"reject the binary approach of the Enlightenment, which forces
individuals to choose between religious liberty (on leaders'
terms) in the private sphere and equality (without normative
community) in the public sphere. ' 237 Throughout much of
Commonwealth Africa, women have the power to exit their cul-
tural communities. In many countries, a woman may, for exam-
ple, marry according to statutory law; she may choose to aban-
don other aspects of custom as well. Other women may cherish
aspects of their cultural identity and community but seek equal-
ity within that community. 238 These women who seek change
233. Bond, supra note 138, at 76.
234. Id.
235. Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 5, at 225.
236. See Bond, supra note 138, at 85.
237. Sunder, supra note 7, at 1408 (describing her theory of "cultural dissent" as "a
fight to constitute individual identity within communities").
238. Sunder remarks:
[C]ulItural dissenters, or 'individuals within a community [who seek] to mod-
ernize, or broaden, the traditional terms of cultural membership,' normatively
challenge traditional liberal understandings of liberty and equality as pre-
mised on a "thin" theory of the self.... I read in the rise of cultural dissent
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without exiting their cultural communities must have the option
of using the constitution to redefine personal and customary law
in a way that reflects equality norms.
In the case of an exclusionary clause, the drafters of the
constitution have privileged women's cultural identity by taking
gender equality (as expressed by women's rights within the fam-
ily) out of the equation. 240 To illustrate the problem, let us ex-
amine a case in which the constitutional scheme allowed custom
to trump gender equality rights. The case involves an interpreta-
tion of the exclusionary clauses in the Zimbabwean Constitution.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe delivered a significant
blow to women's rights activists in the country in Magaya v.
Magaya.241 The case, which involved a woman's right to inherit
from her deceased father, sparked outrage across the country
and the world.2 4 2
Zimbabwe has, at different points in history, been both a
source of optimism with respect to women's equality and a
source of great consternation.2 43 In 1982, Zimbabwe passed the
Legal Age of Majority Act ("LAMA"), which recognized the legal
capacity of both men and women upon reaching eighteen years
of age.24 4 The LAMA was a progressive articulation of women's
equality rights. 24 5 Under the law, women could no longer be
considered legal minors.2 46 In the last decade, however, LAMA's
that human flourishing requires not only a liberty right to normative commu-
nity, but access to community free of the fear of discrimination within it.
Id. at 1409.
239. Of course, women who choose to contest discrimination within their commu-
nities often suffer some loss of community. They may be ostracized as a result of back-
lash from constitutional litigation.
240. With regard to multiculturalism in Israel, Hirschl and Schachar state, "wo-
men's equal citizenship status is impaired by a constitutional system that defers to the
exclusive jurisdiction of religious communities in certain matters of personal status,
including marriage and divorce, and in which the institutions of these communities
systematically disadvantage women." Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 5, at 222.
241. Magaya v. Magaya, [1999] 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb.); Valerie Knobelsdorf, Note,
Zimbabwe's Magaya Decision Revisited: Women's Rights and Land Succession in the Interna-
tional Context, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 749, 768 (2006).
242. See Knobelsdorf, supra note 241, at 750.
243. See id. at 753-56.
244. Legal Age of Majority Act [LAMA] (1982) (Zimb.).
245. See David M. Bigge & Amelie von Briesen, Note, Conflict in the Zimbabwean
Courts: Women's Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARv.
HUM. RTs. J. 289, 305 (2000).
246. See id. at 305-06.
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promise of gender equality has been curtailed by the courts.
The Magaya case revealed the legislative limits of LAMA and
delivered a major setback to women's rights activists. 247
Shonhiwa Magaya died intestate, leaving behind two wives, four
children, a house in the city of Harare, and some cattle. 2 48 A
local court appointed the deceased's eldest child from his first
wife, his daughter Venia Magaya, to be the heir to the estate.24 9
Although the eldest son, Venia Magaya's half-brother from her
father's marriage to his second wife, declined to seek the inheri-
tance, the second-oldest brother challenged Venia's appoint-
ment as heir.250 The Magistrates Court upheld the brother's
challenge and appointed Venia's brother, Nakayi Magaya, as the
heir according to customary law.251 Venia Magaya appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the case focused primarily
on the Constitution and the Administration of Estates Act, which
governs the application of customary law in cases involving intes-
2512tate succession. With respect to constitutional rights, Venia
Magaya argued that non-discrimination principles enshrined in
the Constitution should protect her right to inherit property
from her father.25 ' By excluding personal or customary law
from non-discrimination protection, however, the exclusionary
clause makes such a determination unlikely if not impossible.
Section 11 of the Constitution provides protection for the
"fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual" regardless
of "race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed
247. See Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 245, at 308; Knobelsdorf, supra note 241,
at 768.
248. Magaya, 3 L.RC. at 38; Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 245, at 292-93.
249. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 39; see also Knobelsdorf, supra note 241, at 749.
250. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 38-39; see also Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 245, at 293.
251. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 39; see also Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 245, at 293. In
so doing, the Court applied the Administration of Estates Act, which states:
[I]f any African who has contracted a marriage according to African law or
custom or who, being unmarried, is the offspring of parents married accord-
ing to African law or custom, dies intestate his estate shall be administered and
distributed according to the customs and usages of the tribe or people to
which he belonged.
Id. The Court declined to apply the Administration of Estates Amendment Act, which
includes a formula for the division of property when the deceased dies intestate, be-
cause the facts of the case occurred prior to passage of the amended act. Magaya, 3
L.R.C. at 39.
252. See Knobelsdorf, supra note 241, at 759.
253. Bigge & von Briesen, supra note 245, at 294.
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or sex ".... 254 Section 23, however, which specifically protects
against discrimination, does not include sex or gender as a pro-
tected category.2 5 5 The Court avoided definitively deciding
whether the mention of "sex" in section 11 could be imputed
into section 23's protection against non-discrimination. The
Court avoided the issue by concluding that even if one were to
accept that section 23 included gender by implication, Venia
Magaya would lose her case based on the exclusionary provisions
in the Constitution.2 5 6
The Court then turned its attention to section 23(3), which
states that the non-discrimination provision does not apply to
"matters involving... devolution of property on death ....
Furthermore, section 23(3) stipulates that the non-discrimina-
tion provision does not apply to cases of customary law involving
Africans. 258  Both subsections of section 23, therefore, shielded
the Magaya case from application of the non-discrimination pro-
vision. The Supreme Court concluded that customary law
254. ZIMB. CONST. S. 11 (1996).
255. Id. s. 23. In relevant part, section 23 states:
(1) Subject to other provisions of this section-
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself
or in its effect; and...
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a law shall be regarded as making a
provision that is discriminatory and a person shall be regarded as having been
treated in a discriminatory manner if, as a result of that law or treatment,
persons of a particular description by race, tribe, place of origin, political
opinions, colour or creed are prejudiced ....
(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of sub-
section (1) (a) to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the fol-
lowing matters-
(a) adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death
or other matters of personal law;
(b) the application of African customary law in any case involving Afri-
cans or an African and one or more persons who are not Africans where
such persons have consented to the application of African customary law
in that case ....
ZIMB. CONST. s. 23 (1)-(3).
256. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 39. In Judge Ebrahim's words in Magaya:
However, even if the section was to be interpreted as incorporating the princi-
ple of gender equality enshrined in international human rights instruments to
which Zimbabwe was a party, s. 23(3) of the Constitution expressly exempted
matters involving the devolution of property on death and customary law in-
volving Africans from the discrimination provisions.
Id.
257. ZIMB. CONST. s. 23(3).
258. Id.
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should control and that custom in this case favored males over
females as heirs.25 9
The Magaya case illustrates the difficulties women face
when custom simply trumps gender equality rights. The reverse
situation, in which gender equality rights simply trump cultural
rights, presents a number of problems as well. In this case, a top-
down, gender-trumps-culture approach may have very limited
utility. It may lack legitimacy and, therefore, have minimal im-
pact on the ground. A legal system that uniformly devalues cus-
tom and culture will force rights-seeking women to abandon
their cultural values wholesale in favor of gender equality.26 °
Both of these approaches amount to an either/or approach that
will force women to privilege either their identity as rights-seek-
ing women or their identity as cultured beings.261
C. Activist Intervention-Rights-Balancing
Another method ofjudicial intervention envisions an active
role for judges in the delicate balancing of rights. As Catherine
Albertyn, a noted gender equality expert in South Africa, ob-
serves with regard to the South Africa Constitution, "[a] lthough
there is no clear equality trump in the Constitution, equality's
place as a substantive right and a constitutional value means that
it is unlikely that any cultural practice that discriminates against
women will be constitutionally justified. ' '26 2 The Bhe case pro-
vides an example of a court balancing constitutional equality
rights and rights to culture. 263 The Bhe Court engages in a
259. Magaya, 3 L.R.C at 36.
260. See Sunder, supra note 7, at 1411-12 ("[W]omen reformers in [religious and
cultural] communities increasingly refuse to choose between religion [or culture] and
fights and demand both").
261. As Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar have observed in the context of religious
laws in Israel:
[A] major obstacle to the establishment of Isreali women's full participation as
equals in all spheres of life is the (mis)perception that advancing gender
equality necessarily compromises other important values of the state, such as
the preservation of collective identity, national security, or religious diversity.
As long as the promotion of women's rights and the promotion of other con-
stitutive norms are seen as mutually exclusive, even the most eloquently
worded rights legislation cannot guarantee women's equal treatment and
human dignity.
Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 5, at 222.
262. ALBERTYN, supra note 223, at 24-25.
263. See id. at 26.
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rights-balancing exercise, albeit one that places more weight
on equality rights than rights to culture. I contend that this
"weighted balancing" is an appropriate approach that recognizes
and values the positive aspects of culture but ultimately subjects
that culture to foundational equality norms.
The Bhe case is significant for two reasons. First, it illus-
trates the power of subjecting personal or customary law to con-
stitutional scrutiny.264 As Albertyn notes, the South African Con-
stitution "makes key issues in the public domain (including cul-
ture and religion) subject to public democratic values, such as
equality and freedom."265 Because women's rights activists in
South Africa successfully fought a campaign by traditional lead-
ers to add an exclusionary provision to the new Constitution,
customary law is subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Bill
of Rights and its equality provisions.2 6 6
Second, the decision demonstrates South Africa's attempt
to balance rights to culture and equality. The Constitution itself
reflects a commitment to rights-balancing. Indeed, it reflects a
"weighted balancing" approach that protects the right to culture
but imbues the right to equality with a bit more constitutional
heft. Section 30 of the Constitution, for example, protects the
"right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life
of their choice. '2 67 This right, however, is followed by the simple
caveat that "no one exercising these rights may do so in a man-
ner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights, ' 268 in-
cluding the equality provisions therein. Section 211(3) of the
Constitution provides: "The courts must apply customary law
when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any
legislation that specifically deals with customary law. ' 26" This
provision reflects both a commitment to implementing custom-
ary law and to ensuring that it conforms to constitutional equal-
ity guarantees. This type of clause reappears in a number of con-
264. See id. at 24-27.
265. Id.
266. Id. Albertyn states, "[a]t an early stage of the constitutional negotiations, wo-
men fought to prevent traditional leaders from insulating their communities from the
rights and principles of the new constitutional democracy, especially gender equality."
Id.
267. S. AnR. CONST. s. 30 1996.
268. Id.
269. Id. s. 211(3).
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stitutional provisions.270 This formulation, consisting of a right
to custom and culture followed by a clause reinforcing the pri-
macy of the Bill of Rights, serves to ensure that courts will value
cultural rights but only to the extent that they do not unfairly
infringe on women's constitutional equality rights. 27 1
Justice Langa, writing for the majority in Bhe, reaffirms the
constitutional commitment to the preservation and advance-
ment of customary law in South Africa. The opinion states,
"[c]ertain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt
that our basic law specifically requires that customary law should
be accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South Afri-
can law, provided the particular rules or provisions are not in
conflict with the Constitution." 272 The Court thus situates cus-
tomary law squarely within the constitutional legal order, rein-
forces its societal value, and explicitly limits it by subjecting cus-
tomary law to the Bill of Rights. 27 3
By simultaneously valuing the positive aspects of customary
law and requiring that custom conform to the Bill of Rights, the
Constitution reflects a commitment to rights-balancing. Al-
though the Bhe Court goes to great lengths to articulate its com-
270. Section 31 of the Constitution states:
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic community may
not be denied the right, with other members of that community-
a. To enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language;
and
b. To form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associa-
tions and other organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsis-
tent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
Id. s. 31(1)-(2).
Similarly, section 15 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief
and opinion ....
(2) ....
(3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognizing -
(i) Marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, per-
sonal or family law; or
(ii) Systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to
by persons professing a particular religion.
(iii) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.
Id. s. 15(1)-(3).
271. See id.
272. Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 2004 (18) BHRC 52 (CC) 41 (S. Mr.).
273. Id. 45 ("The positive aspects of customary law have long been neglected.").
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mitment to custom and customary law, gender equality rights
carry the day. It is worth noting here that there is a distinction
between a formulaic gender-trumping approach and a rights-bal-
ancing approach in which gender equality rights prevail. By un-
dervaluing tradition and culture, gender-trumping places wo-
men in the position of choosing between rights to gender equal-
ity and culture. Because it dismisses culture, it lacks legitimacy
in the minds of the people and risks cultural backlash. A
weighted-balancing approach values both cultural and equality
rights but assigns slightly more weight to the gender equality
side of the equation. In this way, it operates as a heightened
standard, one which would require compelling justification for
customary law to infringe on equality rights.
To further promote the balancing of rights, Section 36 of
the South African Constitution requires that a limitation on
rights must be "reasonable and justifiable in an open and demo-
cratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom."
The Court has interpreted this general limitations clause to re-
quire a balancing exercise. The Court has stated, "[a] s a general
rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right,
the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be." '2 74
In the Bhe decision, the Court conducts a 'justification in-
quiry" designed to determine if the rule of male primogeniture
can reasonably and justifiably operate to limit women's rights to
equality and dignity. The Court first notes the centrality and im-
portance of equality and dignity rights, remarking "[t]hey as-
sume special importance in South Africa because of our past his-
tory of inequality and hurtful discrimination on grounds that in-
clude race and gender."275 Because the Court recognized that
the customary rule of male primogeniture eviscerated the consti-
tutional rights to equality and dignity, the justification for the
limitation would need to be extraordinarily compelling. The
Court reasoned that the customary heir's duty to support a sur-
viving widow provided little actual protection for widows and
could not "constitute justification for the serious violation of
rights."276
274. Id. 70 (quoting S v. Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening),
2000 (3) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC) at 32.)
275. Id. 71.
276. Id. 96.
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The "weighted balancing" approach, as exemplified by the
Bhe decision, holds promise for women's rights advocates. It
does not reject custom and tradition as a per se violation of wo-
men's rights. Rather, balancing allows the positive aspects of
custom to flourish, but it does not do so at the expense of wo-
men's equality rights. In addition, the rights-balancing ap-
proach allows judges to acknowledge the ways that customary law
has changed over time. Judges who reject a rigid rights-trump-
ing approach may, when appropriate, recognize the "living" cus-
tomary law and the ways in which it conforms to human rights
standards.
Some South African feminists have advocated an approach
that rejects rights-trumping as overly simplistic.277 These femi-
nists favor "develop[ing] customary law norms and rules in a
manner that is inclusive of women's rights."278 In contrast with
the slower, evolutionary model of limited engagement with cus-
tom, these activists seek new ways to understand and engage with
cultural norms and customary law. Most importantly, they seek
to give voice to the interests of women in those communities.
This approach reflects an intersectional understanding of iden-
tity, one that perceives of women as potentially rights-seeking
feminists and as members of cultural communities. Subjecting
personal and customary law to constitutional non-discrimination
scrutiny provides women with a critical vehicle through which to
initiate and actively participate in a reform process that brings
custom in line with the constitution. In so doing, it makes the
private public.
CONCLUSION
Exclusionary clauses place family law outside of the purview
of the constitution. As such, the clauses result from and perpet-
uate a divide between areas of law long considered public-and
therefore worthy of state intervention-and those considered
private and trivial. The distinction is without merit, both as a
practical matter and as a theoretical inquiry. Practically speak-
ing, states profess non-interference in the family but routinely
regulate family form and benefits. At the theoretical level, femi-
nists have demonstrated how liberalism supports the dichotomy
277. See ALBERTYN, supra note 223, at 26.
278. Id.
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and have offered a critique that mandates state intervention in
the so-called private sphere.
The exclusionary clauses represent a constitutional anach-
ronism. Once a product of colonialism and, more specifically,
the compromises struck at the hands of colonizers and tradi-
tional male elites, the exclusionary clauses have lost political cur-
rency in recent years. Indeed, women's rights activists in South
Africa defeated an effort by traditional leaders to include exclu-
sionary clauses in that country's 1994 Constitution, paving the
way for the landmark Bhe case.27 9 In addition, international and
regional human rights law requires that states eliminate exclu-
sionary clauses to conform to fundamental equality principles.
Exclusionary clauses represent a monolithic understanding
of women's identity, one that requires women to surrender any
aspiration of familial equality in order to enjoy membership in a
cultural community. All over the world, women are exploring
ways to challenge and redefine cultural and religious norms in
ways that reflect a commitment to gender equality. Women
must have the opportunity to exert constitutional agency and to
use the constitution to initiate a societal dialogue concerning
the normative content of the rights to both custom and equality.
Because the exclusionary clauses preclude women's agency in
this area, the countries that have retained them must now elimi-
nate them. This is a crucial opportunity to foster meaningful
societal discourse regarding women's status within their cultural
communities, without forcing allegiance to gender equality at
the expense of culture or vice versa.
Once these constitutions have been amended to eliminate
the exclusionary clauses, judges will have a role to play in the
internalization of new norms. Ideally, constitutional reform will
reflect a commitment to the positive aspects of culture without
pandering to custom and tradition. It will value customary law
but require that customary law conform to individual rights
guarantees. Constitutional reformers may adopt the structure of
the South African Constitution, in which a general limitations
clause requires a balancing of rights. By reflecting a commit-
ment to both culture and equality, the Constitution increases its
legitimacy among the people and stands a greater chance of in-
279. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
20081
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stantiating human rights norms within the judiciary and the pop-
ulace.
Although reforming constitutions to eliminate exclusionary
clauses is only one step on the road to gender equality, it is a
necessary one. Women must have the opportunity to invoke the
constitution to contest discriminatory personal or customary law.
Only by exercising their constitutional agency in this way can
they begin to redefine the contours of personal and customary
law in a way that is consistent with gender equality norms. As
constitutional agents, women have a right to initiate a society-
wide dialogue that will ultimately determine the normative con-
tent and reach of gender equality rights. Through this process
of constitutional amendment, litigation, and corresponding soci-
etal dialogue, women will be a vital part of the discourse, negoti-
ating a balance between respect for cultural communities and
the demand for equality within those communities.
